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" Nothing *conceded* to America by Great Britain can be *imputed to fear*. She will only rise in dignity by " the mildness and moderation of her councils."——A. B.'s letters in the M. Chronicle, Dec. 1807.
" Was there ever any thing so impudent as this! It *must be imputed to fear*, because it could be imputed " to nothing else." ——Register, Vol. XII, p 909.
" Nothing can be obtained from the British government, upon any point, *which is not extorted by neces-* " *sity*." — Mr. Munroe's letter to Mr. Madison. See below.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AMERICAN STATES.——If ever vanity received a wholesome check, such a check has been experienced by this vainest of all vain nations. Of late, little has been said here about the dispute with America. The subject, with much party effort, and much stir amongst the merchants immediately interested in the American trade, was kept alive, and tolerably active, for about a month; but, since that, it has died away, by degrees, 'till, at last, the people in general *hardly know, whether the dispute be terminated or not*; while, at the very same time, the people of America are, by this dispute, thrown into a state of confusion, and almost of revolution. I wish it were possible to enable the people of America to see and observe us, at this time. It would certainly cure them of their vanity, if any thing could. They are all in a bustle and an uproar about the embargo and the other measures adopted to punish England; while the people here, in general, do not know any thing of the nature of those measures, and, indeed, do not know that any measures of the kind have been adopted. The Americans are counting the days and the hours 'till they hear the result of their extraordinary embassies; we seem not to expect any news from America, and not to pay any attention to it when it comes. The newspapers of the two countries present the contrast in the most striking light. Those of America are filled, almost wholly filled, with publications respecting the dispute with England; with discussions upon this or that point connected with it; with vehement attacks upon England, on the one side, and with a defence of her, on the other side; with speeches of members of parliament, relating to the dispute; with extracts of pamphlets, and even with extracts from English newspapers. There is nothing of all this in our newspapers, who scarcely afford a column a month to American affairs, and who, even upon the return of Mr. Rose, have not thought it worth while to make the subject a prominent one; a certain proof, that the nation in general feel great indifference as to every thing connected with America. This is very provoking, to be sure. " What!" (will the conceited American say) " Do " you consider, that the population of the " United States is now equal to that of Eng- " land and Wales?" Very likely; but, as Voltaire is made to say to the friar: " Yes: " we are all men, my friend; but there are " different sorts of men." America is, at this moment, acting the part of the goat that knocked his brains out against the horns of the bull, without being able to disturb the grazing of the latter.——In another part of this double number I have inserted, as far as I had room (and shall insert the remainder as soon as possible), the official papers, relating to the dispute with America; that is to say, since that dispute was made to assume a new shape, in consequence of the attack upon the Chesapeake frigate.——These documents begin with the first Letter from Mr. Madison (the American Secretary of State) to Mr. Munroe, then their envoy in England; then comes the Correspondence between Mr. Munroe and Mr. Canning, interspersed with the Letters, in which Mr. Munroe, from time to time, gave his government an account of what was doing in England, and how the negociation was going on. Next come the Letters, which passed between Mr. Rose and Mr. Madison; and, last of all, a letter from Mr. Erskine to Mr. Madison, informing him officially of the Orders in Council, which had been issued in England.——These Papers will speak for themselves, of course; but, as I am not by any means, certain, that they will be generally read, and, as I have no where seen any brief history of the dispute, I will here attempt to give it, submitting a remark here and there, as I proceed —— An account of the attack upon the American frigate, the Chesapeake, will be found in the Register, Vol. XII. p. 181. The attack took place late in June, 1807, and, as will be seen by the papers now inserted, Mr. Munroe received the first intelligence of it from Mr. Canning, late in the month of July. The latter, foreseeing that advantage would be

taken of this event to couple the attack upon the Chesapeake with the old and unadjusted dispute about searching for seamen on board of merchant ships, took the earliest opportunity of stating to Mr. Munroe, that it would be necessary to take great care not to mingle the discussions relating to the Chesapeake with discussions upon any other topic. In this Mr. Munroe could not but agree, seeing that he was *the first* to say that the affair of the frigate ought to be kept distinct; and, he appeared to be quite tranquil, not apprehending that there would arise any considerable difficulty in the way of an amicable arrangement. Having, however, taken a very short time to consider of the matter, he, without waiting for instructions, or even for official information of the event, writes to Mr. Canning in a very high tone; the affair grows, all at once, into vast importance; and, one can easily perceive, that, in the interim, he has been spurred up to what he himself did not, at first, dream of. Mr. Canning, who displays talents that almost any man might envy; very properly notices this change of tone, as calculated to excite some degree of surprize, and as being no very good sign; but, he takes care, in a mild manner, to let Mr. Munroe perceive very clearly, that he has little to hope for from the effect of fear. Soon after this comes the letter of Mr. Madison to Mr. Munroe, who chooses to begin the negociation by *conferences* with Mr. Canning, rather than by a written correspondence, and that this choice was not without a very sufficient motive we shall, by and by, perceive. Having obtained this point, he, in his first interview, stated the reparation, which his government expected; namely, first, "that the men taken "from on board the Chesapeake, should be "restored to it: second, that the officers, "who had committed the aggression, should "be exemplarily punished; third, that the "practice of impressment from merchant "vessels should be suppressed; and, lastly, "that the reparation, consisting of those several acts, should be announced to the "American government through the medium of a special mission."——Set a beggar on horse-back, says the old proverb, and he'll ride to the Devil. Was there ever any thing so insolent as this before heard of? What! give up our deserters to them; set these men at liberty; punish Captains Douglas and Humphreys and Admiral Berkeley; give up our right of searching for our own seamen on board of their merchant ships; thereby giving our navy a stab to the very heart; and, to send a special representative of the king to announce all this to Thomas Jefferson! I am not fit for a diplomatist; for, I should certainly have tried, at least, to knock the man down, who should have made to me such a proposition.——Mr. Canning resisted this abominable demand, and insisted, particularly, that the affair of the Chesapeake, should be kept, as a subject of negociation, distinct from all other points in dispute; and, thus the conference ended.—— Directly afterwards Mr. Munroe presented a Note, in which he demanded the reparation; but, as will be seen by a reference to the Note itself, he confined his express demand to a suppression of our searching merchant ships for deserters, omitting the other acts required of us, for the reasons which he gives to Mr. Madison, thus: "As it had not been "in my power to come to any agreement "with Mr. Canning on the general subject "of impressment from merchant vessels, I "considered it my duty to combine it with "the affair of the Chesapeake, in the paper "which I presented to him to claim repa-"ration for the outrage. I thought it best, "however, *to omit the other acts*, of which "it was desired that the reparation should "consist, as it seemed probable, that a spe-"cification of each circumstance, in the "note, would increase the indisposition of "the ministry to accommodate, and *give it* "*support with the nation, in a complete re-*"*jection of the demand.* I expressed my-"self, therefore, in regard to the other acts, "in *general and conciliatory terms.*"——It must have greatly surprized Mr. Madison to find, that a precaution like this was necessary. He, modest man, expected that the ministers would have the whole nation join in a cry against them, if they hesitated one moment in yielding to the demands of our excellent customers across the Atlantic. He and Mr. Jefferson thought, what they had often said, that America might live well without a communication with England; but, that England could not live at all without a communication with America.—But, though Mr. Munroe suppressed the demand of those "*other acts*," in his note, he obtained an interview with Mr. Canning, to say, that they were merely omitted for the present, but would, of course, be expected. This was all in vain, however; for Mr. Canning, finding the American government resolved to come to no settlement, which should not include a surrender of our right to search their merchant vessels for our seamen, positively refused to negociate upon the affair of the Chesapeake, except as entirely distinct from all other matters in dispute. Thus, the negociation was brought to an end in England; and Mr. Munroe soon

afterwards set off for America.——Let us now compare *dates* a little. Mr. Madison's letter to Mr. Munroe, containing the instructions to make high demands, was written on the 6th of July. The peace of Tilsit was made on the 7th of that month; but, for, at least, two months previous, the affairs of the allies had been in so desperate a way as to leave no doubt at all, that the result would be, peace on Napoleon's own terms, and, of course, a combination of the Northern powers against England. Indeed, this was, in the Register of the 13th of June, stated as a conjecture, upon the subject. It was, therefore, with this view of the state of Europe, and of the critical state of England, before his eyes, that Mr. Jefferson, the just and wise Mr. Jefferson; ordered his Envoy to make the demand above stated. But, before the demand reached England, that is to say, the latter end of August, Mr. Munroe had been able to discover, that the events upon the continent of Europe, after having been a nine days' wonder, had set people to thinking, and that reflection had taught them, that there was no real ground of alarm ——When Mr. Munroe wrote his first note to Mr. Canning, the merchants of Liverpool and other places had begun to clamour in favour of America; but, before the second was written, the public mind had been enlightened upon the subject, and, the clamours of those merchants, who had begun to dictate to the government in a high strain, were changed into miserable wailings. His second note was written on the 7th of September. I beg the reader to look back to the Register of the 5th of that month; and, he will be able, I believe, to discover a very sufficient cause for Mr. Munroe's having softened his tone. If he will look, particularly at page 366 of Vol. XII. he will not be at all surprized, that Mr. Munroe should be anxious to keep his humiliating demands out of an official note, which he must know the ministers might have been called upon to publish.——The negociation, if it may be so called, carried on by Mr. Munroe and Mr. Canning, began late in July, and closed early in October; and, it is really worth while for any one, who has the leisure, to read the correspondence in company with my articles in the Register, written during the same period. It would be still better worth while, if we could see the *whole* of Mr. Munroe's letters to Mr. Madison, especially where he talks about those, in this country, *who are disposed for producing a war with America.* "Such," says he, "in his letter of the 4th of August, "is the state of this country, at the present "crisis, that it is impossible to foresee what "will be its course of conduct towards the "U. States. There has been at all times "since the commencement of the present "war, *a strong party* here for extending its "ravages to them. This party is composed "of the ship owners, the *navy*, the East and "West India merchants, and several political characters of great consideration in the "state. So powerful is this combination, "that it is most certain that nothing can be "obtained of the government on any point, "but what may be *extorted by necessity.* "The disasters to the *north* ought to inspire "moderation; but with respect to the "northern powers, it seems to have produced directly the opposite effect. A fleet "of about 25 sail of the line, with a suitable number of frigates, &c. and above "20,000 men has been lately equipped, and "sent to the Baltic, as it is said, to take possession of the Danish and Russian navies. "This measure is imputed to an understanding which it is supposed has been established between the cabinets of Russia "and Paris by the late peace, and which has "for its object a concert of measures for the "purpose of attempting to force on this "country *a maritime code, more favourable "to neutral nations.*"——So, this "strong *party*" included the *navy*, did it, Mr. Munroe? *That* is a pretty stout limb of a party, I must confess. But, are you sure, Mr. Madison, that Mr. Munroe, in none of his letters, said any thing about that "wicked rascal Cobbett," as your ruffian-like editors of newspapers now call me? Are you quite sure, that he did not tell you, that I had been the most formidable enemy he had had to encounter? You do, indeed, let your poor foolish citizens hear Mr. Munroe's complaints against the English newspapers; but, you keep from them what he says against *me* in particular. I will tell you, then, Sir, that I have been credibly informed, that *you* have said, that, had it not been for me, the government of England would have acceded to your demands. You have been deceived, for Mr. Canning knew what the state and the temper of America were; though, I must say, that I verily believe, that he, as well as others, in this country, who possess similar knowledge, derived it chiefly from me. "How poor a thing may do a noble service!" I have, it must be confessed, pretty well rubbed the varnish off you. In other countries you may still pass for sterling; but here, in England (the only country that I care about), you will, for the time to come, go for no more than your worth.——"A party," indeed! A war-party against America! I think I know as much of parties and

of political sentiments as Mr. Munroe did; and, I never knew a single man express his desire to see a war with America. But, here again is an instance of the delusion of vanity. The American minister expected to see England, under the then circumstances, fall down at his feet; and, when he found the contrary, he could ascribe it to nothing short of *a combination*; the influence of *a party*. To have said that *the nation* was hostile to further concessions, would have been to acknowledge, that England was not terrified out of its wits at the sound of American hostility; and that would not have answered the purpose. It was, therefore, necessary to conjure up "*a party*;" a combination; something out of the common way; something almost supernatural. "Nothing can "be obtained from the government, upon "any point, but what may be *extorted by* "*necessity*." This was *always* their opinion of us; this is what they always said; and, every thing they obtained, they always thanked their own power for, and not our disposition to conciliate. I told A. B. (most likely Alexander Baring) of the Morning Chronicle, that every concession, on our part, would be ascribed to our fears; that, one concession would, of course, lead to the demand of another; and, that, therefore, it was as well to stop at once, unless we meant to go on, until we had not a ship or a seaman left. The truth of this is now proved by the sentiments of Mr. Munroe, expressed in confidence to his government. His government thought we were *down*. "She is down," said one of their judges, in the year 1795; "she is in her last agonies, and we have nothing to do but to seize her by the throat, "and rid the world of her at once." This was a *judge*. The Chief-Justice of the State of South Carolina. He was not singular in his taste. She was not down, however. She has stood ever since; and, the embargoed nation feels her power still. No; Mr. Munroe. It was no "party" that took up the cudgels against America, though there was a party who took them up for her. There were the whole of the Whigs for her; the whole of the American merchants; and several hired writers, amongst whom were the Edinburgh Reviewers; but, to all these was opposed the sense of the unsold part of the nation; and, if you have got the better of your national vanity, you would have said to Mr. Madison: "I find, Sir, that we have "played with the mouse, 'till we have lost it. "This nation, who are so easily cajoled, and "whom we have cajoled so long, when once "they do get their slow-motioned eyes "open, are remarkably clear-sighted, I perceive; and, I have further perceived, that, "if their pliancy is of long duration, they, "in the end pay it off in stubborness. You "and I were deceived in our hopes of taking advantage of what we looked upon "as their disasters in the North of Europe; "for they have taken it into their heads, "that it is precisely under such circumstances, that they ought to concede nothing "to any body. Besides, Sir, I must tell "you, that, though we think ourselves a "great nation, we are not, in Europe, viewed in that light. The nations, in this "quarter of the world, regard us as something but little better than a race of half-civilized people, settled promiscuously "along an extended and defenceless coast; "and when I talk of our *navy* and of *going* "*to war*, though they do not actually laugh "in my face, I can clearly perceive, that "they laugh at me the moment my back is "turned. Then again, as to their commerce "with us, which, you know, we used to "think they must instantly perish for the "want of; would you believe it, I do not "find them at all alarmed upon the subject; "they have, I understand, but about "300,000 persons (men, women, and children) employed in matters connected with "all their foreign commerce put together; "and there are, amongst their public writers, men who maintain, that their commerce with us is injurious, instead of being beneficial, to them; for that their "wool and iron and copper and tin and linen is much more useful than our tobacco, or any other thing that we send them. "You and I used to contrast the vast extent "of our dominions with the pitiful compass "of theirs, and used to be impatient for the "day when we should surpass them in population. My impatience, upon this "score, is considerably abated; for, "lord, "Sir," as SCRUB says in the play, "these "are clearly another sort of people than "we." You and I used to wonder how it "could be that such a little island should be "suffered to lord it over the ocean, and remain, in other respects, so powerful. But, "dear friend, if you were to come here "you would cease to wonder at this; for, "you cannot imagine what quantities of "horses and cattle and sheep and corn and "houses and goods and implements and "clothing, you cannot imagine what quantities of every thing, which constitutes national strength, the industry of this people "has collected from the surface and extracted from the bowels of the earth. When "I first came hither, I used to laugh at "their rivers; and, I was highly diverted

" to see " Father Thames," as their poets " call it, " rolling his majestic flood," not " half so large as one of the smallest of our " *creeks*, and not much larger than what we " call *a run of water*. But, when I came " to consider, that mere water was neither " wealth nor strength, and when I saw that " there were more valuable things floated " upon this little run of water than upon all " our immense rivers put together, it did, I " confess, give a new turn to my thoughts. " This is indeed a very small country, " but it is all life and strength. It is full " of those things which come to the aid of " the personal strength of man; and, all this " mass of strength is so manageable, is so " easily wielded, that it almost seems as if the " people had the country upon their backs. " They are, too, so patient in their pursuits; " so constant, so steady, in their labour; " the same calling and the same habits and " the same character descend from father to " son, and for several succeeding genera- " tions. Our rascalions, you know, are " everlastingly *shirking* about from place " to place, in search of new shops or new " lands, so that, except amongst the Quakers " and some of the Yankees, our population " is in a continual state of swarming. But, " in this country, my dear Madison, it is " not the lords alone who have any thing " hereditary about them. Here are heredi- " tary shoemakers and taylors and black- " smiths and wheelwrights, who, for many " generations have lived under the same " roof. Our farmers, you know, are all " speculators; all aiming at fortunes; all " trying to get rich at a heat; but, here, " though country-banking and agricultural " societies have done something towards cor- " rupting the manners of the farmers, a fair " proportion of them still retain the sim- " plicity of their forefathers, content with " a bare competence, and desiring nothing " more than those forefathers enjoyed. In " their athletic sports, the people of this " country are exemplary indeed. They " scorn to take advantage of one another " even in the moments of their greatest " eagerness and anger. They never kick " and scratch and bite, as the people do in " your and my country; and, as to gouging " out one another's eyes, they are by no " means to be made believe that the thing " is practised except amongst cannibals, " though you and I know that it is very " common amongst most excellent citizens, " in what we call the most enlightened " country in the world. But, what would " surprise you most of all, my dear friend, " is the honesty and fair dealing of the " common people in England, which ap- " pears to be instinctive. Here men take " one another's word for half as much as " they are worth in the world. I am afraid " you will think me romancing, but, I as- " sure you, that it is very common for a " man to offer another a thing for sale, and " having promised to hold to his offer for a " certain time, to keep his promise, though " he should be offered twice the sum in the " meanwhile. I am informed, that there " are many farmers, who send their money " to great fairs at a distance, by the hands " of dealers, to purchase them cattle and " sheep, and that there are no bills or re- " ceipts pass between any of the parties, " and that the farmer knows nothing at all " of the seller, and, what will amaze you is, " that the dealer, who is generally a poor " man that tramps it to the fair, continues " poor to the end of his days. Only, my " dear Madison, think of the value of this " integrity, this confidence between man " and man! One man, and that man too in " a low state of life, performs the business, " which, were it not for this confidence, " would take many men, for several days, " from their homes and concerns. The " like of this is unknown in any other " country that I am acquainted with; and " this quality, working in various unseen " ways, is one of the great bulwarks of the " nation. In short, my dear friend, I have " been in England long enough to have all " the prejudices, engendered by our revo- " lution, removed. The character of Eng- " lishman is an object of my envy; but, I " would confess this to no human being " but you, who, a truly honest man your- " self, would, had you been in my situation, " have experienced a conversion like mine."

——This, Mr. Munroe, or something like this, is what you would have said, if you had spoken from the bottom of your heart. You are not one of those silly creatures, who have come to England for the sake of strutting about with lords and ladies; and who, after having obtained visitors by paying their way with gold, and having found, that, " no longer pipe no longer dance," have returned home in disappointment and disgust. You are a gentleman in fortune as well as in mind; and, whatever you may *say* of us, you must *think* us the best people that you have yet seen, and must feel some degree of pride, that this is the country whence your forefathers sprang. Let us hope, then, that you will use your influence for the purpose of repressing that incessant desire, which prevails in your country, to do that which shall tend to humble England.

Be assured, that the people of this country now understand the whole of all the points in dispute; and that, let who will be ministers, they will not dare to make the concessions which you have demanded. You will be able to "extort" nothing from our necessities. There is no "party" that can, or that would if they could, lend you their assistance. For the sake of worrying one another, in their disgraceful struggles for place, they may side with you in appearance, and, I am pretty confident that the last ministry you had nearly cajoled to do it in earnest; but *now* there is no party, there is no one man of any character in the whole nation, who would become an advocate for your claims.——The subsequent part of the proceedings are of less importance. When the ministers found, that the American government was determined not to settle the affair of the Chesapeake, unless the settlement included a renunciation, on our part, of the right of searching their merchant vessels for our deserters, they resolved upon sending a special envoy to offer atonement for the attack upon the Chesapeake, but not to permit him to negociate upon any other point whatever; and, at the same time, they issued a proclamation, in which the king declared, that he never would give up the right in question. It is, therefore, probable, that the negociation between Mr. Rose and Mr. Madison would, if it had been commenced, have soon been broken off; but, it was, as the reader will perceive, prevented from beginning by the refusal of the American government to rescind their hostile proclamation, which our ministers justly considered as an act of *retaliation*, and the rescinding of which they demanded as a step previous to their tendering any reparation at all. This demand was refused, and, of course, Mr. Rose came back as he went.——The reader will perceive, that the Americans *now* choose to represent the hostile proclamation, not as an act of *retaliation*, but as an act of *precaution*. As if they were afraid, that we should send in our ships to burn their towns! Believe them who will; for my part, the contrary is evident to me; and, so it, at first, was to them; for they, in all their news-papers, called it an act of *retaliation*. See the proclamation itself in page 249 of Vol. XII. and say whether it be an act of mere *precaution*. It was the mildest measure they could adopt, Mr. Madison says; and I say it was the harshest, because they had it not in their power to injure or annoy us in any other way. It was the worst they could do. It was not a blow, for a blow they were unable to deal us; but it was spitting in our faces. It was, too, a measure still in existence, at the time when Mr. Rose arrived in America; and, therefore, to have offered reparation, until it was rescinded, would have been disgraceful to us in the highest degree. It would have been begging pardon with a cane suspended over our shoulder. It would have been going one step further than the late ministers, who entered upon a negociation touching the right of search, while the Americans had a non-importation act passed for the avowed purpose of compelling us to give up that right, and kept suspended over our heads ready to be put in execution, in case we refused to accede to the terms proposed.——The result of this negociation, or rather, the total failure of it, proves the truth of what I told the ministers from the first; that is, that every step in the way of concession, would but cause the difficulties to thicken. If they had stood firm upon the ground of *maritime dominion*, there would have been a loud out-cry for a few weeks; but what would the Americans have done *more than they have done now?* They have now done their worst, and they could have done no more. There would have been an end, for ever, of all claims and disputes about searching ships. And, to this it must come at last. In *reality* it is so now. We *do* exercise an absolute maritime dominion. We must exercise it, or we cannot remain independent of France. It would, therefore, be better to do it, at once, avowedly, and not encumber the thing with *Orders in Council*, and other trappings, which only serve to rob the principle of its simplicity and dignity. The alarm of Mr. Alexander Baring and his brother wiseacre, Mr. Roscoe, that the open avowal of such a principle will rouse and unite the world against us, is curious enough, at a moment when all the world is actually so roused and united. America is as much our enemy as she *can* be. Nothing can possibly make her more so. She would declare war, but she dare not. There is no fear of "throwing her into the arms "of France." She is there already as much as she can be. Our ships of war keep the two dear friends asunder. What the revolution of Spain may do, by placing the countries, joining the United States, under the immediate controul of France, I know not. If the Americans were not such miserable slaves to their envy and hatred of England, this event would, at once, produce an alliance offensive and defensive between us and them; but, I am of opinion, that it will produce no such effect, until severe suffering (which is in store for them) shall have

taught them justice and modesty. The Floridas are inhabited by Spaniards; Louisiana by Spaniards and Frenchmen; the key of the Mississippi is in their hands. Without the aid of England, it is impossible for the Southern and Western States of the American union to maintain themselves against France, if attacked by her; and, to avoid being attacked there is but one way, that is, by doing what Napoleon shall command; in other words, yield to him without resistance.——What a fine field would, by this revolution in Spain, be opened for a grand co-operation of England and America, were it not for the rancour of the leaders in the latter country! The way for them to proceed is so plain, that it needs not to be pointed out. How natural, how glorious, would such a co-operation be! But, it is not for *us* to endeavour to *hasten* it. The first motions towards it must come from the other side; and they will not come, 'till the people, the *real* people of America, shall rouse themselves, trample under foot the slaves of France, and resolve to act for their own interests. This event can be at no great distance. They know what French armies are. They, *personally*, hate the French; and, when once they have them in their neighbourhood, they will begin seriously to think of their means of defence. Drive them from the continent of North America they must; or they must themselves become subjects of France. There is no other alternative. They cannot drive them away without the aid of England; and the giving of that aid will naturally and necessarily lead to a connection, which may have a wonderful effect in the world. But, it cannot too often be repeated, that the first movements towards such a connection, *must not be made by us.*

SPAIN.——The several papers, containing the history of the revolution, which now seems to be completed in Spain, shall follow, in the Register, those relating to the dispute with America. In the mean while, the event itself furnishes but few topics for observation, nothing having taken place but what might have been naturally expected. When I was, in my last Register, observing upon the toasts of Mr. Blackburn and his Pitt-dinner associates, I little thought, that there was, in the post office, the news-paper which contained the intelligence, that what I anticipated had actually taken place. "The *people* of Spain," indeed! There was no such thing as a people in Spain. There were some millions of animals, walking about upon two legs each; but, they were, in a political point of view, no more than so many head of cattle. Gregory King's rabbits were beings of an order rather superior to them. What folly, to suppose that such creatures would make a stand in defence of their country. And, *for what?* What could they possibly lose? How could they possibly become more wretched, or more degraded? The Courier reminds us, that MURAT is the son of a little ale-house keeper. Well, and what then? Is he an ideot, or a poor rascally, cowardly debauchee? Lord Nelson was the son of a country parson; and, yet it appeared that he had a good sort of blood flowing in his veins. A wise and brave man, particularly if he be a soldier (by sea or land, I mean, of course), may, at all times, bid defiance to heraldry. It is only the insignificant that need be anxious about their descent. Is it not better for a nation to be under the sway of the gallant son of an alehouse-keeper, than of a king's son, who is known through the world for a stinking coward? Before the Courier tells us any more about the ale-house-keeper's son, I should like for him to refer us to some youths of royal descent, who have discovered discretion and courage equal to Murat, who appears to me to be one of the most able as well as most valiant of those, who have been raised up for the purpose of chastising the cruel and cowardly oppressors of nations. We have, in this case of Spain, the contrast completely before us. We see, at one view, those who have been put down and those who have been raised up; and, let the reader say, whom he would prefer to be under, Murat or the king, or prince, of Spain, seeing that the oppression of the former cannot be more complete than that of the latter.——There is one view of subjects of this sort, that such writers as the editor of the Courier never take. There lies the continent of Europe before us. Twenty years ago, it consisted of nations, governed by kings and princes and nobles of ancient families, who were supported, in the exercise of their authority, by laws and usages and habits of the growth of centuries upon centuries. They and their authority, with exceptions too trifling to mention, are now destroyed; and, in their stead, we see men, who, at the time when the change began to work, were totally unknown to the world at large, and almost to their next-door neighbours. What must these kings and princes and nobles have been? And what must have been the nature of their governments? The cause has been said to be the perverseness of the people, stimulated by artful men. But, how came there to be matter for those artful men to work

upon? And, by what magic of rhetoric did those artful men persuade the people of so many nations, that the sway of obscure, nay, of as yet unknown, individuals, would be preferable to that of those dignified persons, whom, for ages, their ancestors had obeyed? MALLET DU PAN endeavoured to defend the nobles of France against the charge of having *deserted* their country; but, what did all his arguments prove? Why, that the people so hated them, that they could not remain. It is very true, that the people may be deceived, that a tumult may be excited against a good king, or a good nobility; but, this cannot be general, and of long duration, especially when there is *no leader*, as was the case in France. But, supposing it possible for a nation to be so completely blinded, and to act so strangely as to pull down their government, without the aid of a leader, and that, too, without any just cause; still the *example* of that nation would naturally be an object of terror. Not so has it been in this case. The other nations of the continent have followed the example of France; and, from any facts that reach us, it does not appear, that they repent of it. Besides, supposing the whole change to have been a work of ignorance and wickedness; still, we have to call upon the ancient rulers as being answerable for that ignorance and that wickedness; for, they had the power, and to them it belonged to teach their people wisdom and virtue. Therefore, puzzle about as long as we please amongst details of causes and effects, there has been a struggle of "ale-house keepers' "sons" against the kings and princes and nobles of the continent of Europe, and the former have decidedly beaten the latter, have driven them from their thrones and authorities, and have put themselves in their stead. Such being the fact, it is quite useless to complain of the taste of the people; it is nonsense to complain of it; the Courier may as well rail against the climate of the several nations, governed by ale-house keepers' sons. The thing is *done*. The doom of the kings and princes and nobles of the continent of Europe is irrevocable.——There is one circumstance, in the events of this Spanish revolution, which is well worthy of attention; and that is, that the old king, to the very last, boasts, in all his public acts, of the fidelity and affection of his loving subjects; the son, for the few days that he is upon the throne, does the same; and, in all the proclamations from the officers of state, generals, &c. the king is spoken of as being "the father of his peo-"ple," and as being an object of more than filial affection. Nay, when the young king is upon his route to Bayonne (never more to return to Spain), he is escorted amidst the huzzas of the people, who, we are told, contended for the honour of having him tarry a few minutes amongst them. Still more: while this very journey is performing, there is a royal *birth day* celebrated, and we are told of those who came to the court to pay their gratulations upon the "*happy* occasion." Such is the stuff which what is, now-a-days, called *loyalty* is made of! The state trickery, the humbug, of reciprocal affection was, you see, kept up to the last moment. I dare say, that there were poets, of all sizes, at work in singing the virtues of the royal family, 'till they crossed the frontier; that the parasites of the play-houses were straining their hired throats to *God save the king*; that the venal wretches, assembled at taverns, were drinking *loyal* toasts; and, that the writers of paragraphs and of court-news were trumpeting forth the praises, and rejoicing at the health and spirits, of a "*be-*"*loved* monarch and his *amiable* consort, "who had so long reigned over a happy "and grateful people." Away, in a moment, as quick as lightning, is gone all this despicable cant; all this state flummery. The king of Spain will now, for the first time in his life, hear the truth; and, which is a still more pleasing reflection, his late subjects will now dare to say what they think of him and his family. What a delightful thing it must be to behold millions of men, having, all at once, their lips unlocked! Relieved from the galling restraint of silence, while they hear fools and knaves eulogized as the most wise and virtuous of men! I know of nothing more provoking; nothing more painful; nothing that can render life more intolerable; than to be obliged to hear conceited fools, greedy profligates, and bragging cowards, praised to the skies, and to be compelled to hold one's tongue. It does not signify to talk, for, to be released from this heart-burning restraint the soul of man must earnestly desire. ——As to the effect which this revolution will produce, with respect to England, it cannot, I should think, except in the single case of America, above spoken of, be material; for, whether the Bourbons were left upon the throne or not, the French, now that they have, *for the present*, settled the north, would have gone southward. There is a talk of expeditions to Spain and to South America; but *why* they should have been thought adviseable merely on account of the revolution in Spain, there

does not appear to me any solid reason. There may, possibly, be something done, in the way of getting a surrender of Spanish ships of war; but, the country must be safe enough against any attack of ours, in a short time; and, I should think, that a siege of Gibraltar would naturally follow. Much more than I am afraid of that, however, I am afraid of expeditions to *South America*, where the troops and the people are already under the guidance of French officers, where every attempt would be attended with dreadful slaughter, and where, if we succeeded, success would be followed by an insupportable burden, making a deduction from our strength of every description. As if we were *too strong* at home, the ministers are now urgently called upon to send forth, and to waste, our strength, in those distant countries. The project recommended is to make the people *independent*. What good would that do us, and what harm would it do Napoleon? Were there an independent nation formed in Mexico or Peru, it needs no spirit of prophesy to tell, that the West India islands would soon belong to that nation. It is the dream of some, that we are to have *alliances* with these new nations. If we had them, they would prove a new curse to us; and, as to the supplying of those nations with goods, what can we do more in that way than we now do?—— One thing is to be observed, that this revolution in Spain will assuredly cause a protraction of the war. The new sovereignty will be too green, for this year or two to come, to make a decent figure in a treaty of peace. Such a nation is not to be settled again in peace. There must be a sufficient time for men's ears to become accustomed to the new sounds, before peace can be thought of. "HIS MOST CATHOLIC MAJESTY" will probably, have made way for "JOACHIM I;' but, we shall be ashamed to adopt it just yet; and, this, joined to the natural desire, that Napoleon must, for some time, have to keep the continent in war, will certainly put off the hour of peace. We may, therefore, unless some *accident* befal us, count upon another five or six years of war. I think, that the conqueror has by no means done with Austria or Russia or Prussia; and, I am, in short, persuaded, that he will dispossess every ancient royal family upon the continent of Europe, that, perhaps, of Sweden excepted. Out of this opinion arises, very naturally, great alarm in my mind as to where we shall look for *wives* for our royal family. This is a very grave subject, reader; for, you are, I hope, seriously impressed with the necessity of our having persons of illustrious descent for our queens and princesses To marry into the Buonaparté family would be shocking; but, what shall we do if all the continent of Europe be stocked with nothing else? While Europe was in its former state, so happily were we situated in this respect, that the most agreeable of connections were formed, and yet all was kept, by one means or another, in the family. But, I will pursue these reflections no further, at present, trusting that some civilian, accustomed to Delicate Investigations, will favour me with a line or two, in order to tranquillize my mind. ——I cannot close this article without once more recurring to the adulatory language and conduct of the people in Spain to a king just about to be dethroned, and in whose defence not a single sword was drawn. A paragraph, dated Madrid, April 17th, says: "king Ferdinand has commenced "his journey to meet Napoleon. On the "12th of this month, he entered Burgos "in a *magnificent equipage* constructed for "the purpose at the charge of that city, "and *drawn by sixty men*, attired in the "*ancient Spanish costume*. The city of "Victoria, and many others, intreated "that the ILLUSTRIOUS and BELOVED "traveller would visit them in his progress. "To all these petitions he answered in the "most condescending terms." —— This puts one so much in mind of what one has read elsewhere, and about other persons, that it cannot fail to awaken a train of interesting thoughts. "*Illustrious* and *be*-"*loved* traveller"! Vile slaves! Detestable hypocrites! You hated him, and he despised you. This is, I suppose, what is called *loyal* language? Miserable will be the king, who, in an hour of danger, shall look for defenders amongst flatterers! All the kings that have been pulled down have been represented to us as being adored by their subjects. Will kings and princes never take warning? Will they never profit from experience? Will they go on believing in none but their parasites?

Botley, 9th June, 1808.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

AMERICAN STATES.——*The following Papers were communicated to the Congress, by President Jefferson, on the 22d of March,* 1808.——*They are all the principal Official Letters, which have been written upon the subject of the dispute now existing between England and the American States.——They begin with*

MR. MADISON'S *(American Secretary of State)*, *to* MR. MUNROE *(the American Minister in London)*, *and embracing the Correspondence between Mr. Munroe and* MR. CANNING *(the English Secretary of State)*, *conclude with the correspondence between* MR. ROSE *(the English special Envoy to America) and Mr. Madison.*

MR. MADISON TO MR. MUNROE, JULY 6, 1807.

Sir,—The documents herewith enclosed, from No. 1 to No. 9 inclusive, explain the hostile attack, with the insulting pretext for it, lately committed near the capes of Virginia by the British ships of war Leopard, on the American frigate Chesapeake, No. 10 is a copy of the proclamation issued by the president, interdicting in consequence of that outrage the use of our waters and every other accommodation to all British armed ships. This enormity is not a subject for discussion. The immunity of a national ship of war from every species and purpose of search on the high seas, has never been contested by any nation. G. Britain would be second to none in resenting such a violation of her rights and such an insult on her flag. She may bring the case to the test of her own feelings, by supposing that instead of the customary demand of our mariners serving compulsively even on board her ships of war, opportunities had been seized for rescuing them, in like manner, whenever the superiority of force or the chance of surprize might be possessed by our ships of war.—But the present case is marked by circumstances which give it a peculiar die. The seamen taken from the Chesapeake had been ascertained to be native citizens of the U. States, and this fact was made known to the bearer of the demand, and doubtless communicated by him to his commander previous to the commencement of the attack. It is a fact also, affirmed by two of the men, with every appearance of truth, that they had been impressed from American vessels into the British frigate, from which they escaped, and by the third, that having been impressed from a British merchant ship, he had accepted the recruiting bounty under that duress and with a view to alleviate his situation, till he could escape to his own country; and that the attack was made during a period of negociation, and in the midst of friendly assurances from the British government.—The printed papers herewith sent, will enable you to judge of the spirit which has been roused by the occasion. It pervades the whole community—is abolishing the distinctions of party—and, regarding only the indignity offered to the sovereignty and flag of the nation, and the blood of citizens so wantonly and wickedly shed, demands in the loudest tone an honorable reparation—With this demand you are charged by the president. The tenor of his proclamation will be your guide in reminding the British government of the uniform proofs given by the U. States, of their disposition to maintain faithfully every friendly relation; of the multiplied infractions of their rights by British naval commanders on our coasts and in our harbors; of the inefficacy of reiterated appeals to the justice and friendship of that government; and of the moderation on the part of the U. States, which reiterated disappointments had not extinguished; till at length no alternative is left, but a voluntary satisfaction on the part of G. Britain, or a resort to means depending on the U. States alone. —The nature and extent of the satisfaction ought to be suggested to the British government, not less by a sense of its own honor than by justice to that of the U. States. A formal disavowal of the deed, and restoration of the four seamen to the ship from which they were taken, are things of course, and indispensable. As a security for the future, an entire abolition of impressments from vessels under the flag of the U. States, if not already arranged, is also to make an indispensible part of the satisfaction. The abolition must be on terms compatible with the instructions to yourself and Mr. Pinckney on this subject; and, if possible, without the authorised rejection from the service of the U. States of British seamen who have not been two years in it. Should it be impossible to avoid this concession on the part of the U. States, it ought, as of itself more than a reasonable price for future security, to extend the reparation due for the past. —But beyond these indispensible conditions, the U. States have a right to expect every solemnity of form and every other ingredient of retribution and respect which according to usage and the sentiments of mankind, are proper in the strongest cases of insult to the rights and sovereignty of a nation. And the British government is to be apprized of the importance of a full compliance with this expectation to the thorough healing of the wound which has been made on the feelings of the American nation.—Should it be alledged as a ground for declining or diminishing the satisfaction in this case, that the U. States have themselves taken it by the interdict contained in the proclamation, the answer will be obvious. The interdict is a measure, not of reparation, but of precaution, and would besides be amply justified

by recurrences prior to the extraordinary outrage in question.—The exclusion of all armed ships whatever from our waters, is in fact so much required by the vexations and dangers to our peace experienced from their visits, that the president makes it a special part of the charge to you, to avoid laying the U. States under any species of restraint from adopting that remedy. Being extended to all belligerent nations none of them could of right complain, and with the less reason, as the policy of most nations has limited the admission of foreign ships of war into their ports, to such numbers as being inferior to the naval force of the country, could be readily made to respect its authority and laws.—As it may be useful, in enforcing the justice of the present demand, to bring into view applicable cases, especially where G. Britain has been the complaining party, I refer you to the ground taken and the language held by her, in those of Falkland's island and Nootka Sound, notwithstanding the assertion by Spain in both cases, that the real right was in her, and the possessory only in G. Britain. These cases will be found in the Annual Registers for 1771, and 1790, and in the parliamentary debates for those years. In the latter you will find also, two cases referred to, in one of which the French king sent an ambassador extraordinary to the king of Sardinia, in the most public and solemn manner, with an apology for an infringement of his territorial rights in the pursuit of a smuggler and murderer. In the other case, an ambassador extraordinary was sent by the British government to the court of Portugal, with an apology for the pursuit and destruction, by admiral Boscawen, of certain French ships on the coasts of this last kingdom. Many other cases, more or less analagous, may doubtless be found; see, particularly, the reparation by France to G. Britain, for the attack on Turk's island in 1764, as related in the Annual Register, and in Smollet's continuation of Hume, vol. 10; the proceedings in the case of an English merchantman, which suffered much in her crew and otherwise, from the fire of certain Spanish xebecs cruizing in the Mediterranean; and the execution of the lieutenant of a privateer, for firing a gun into a Venetian merchantman, which killed the captain, as stated in the Annual Register for 1781, page 94. The case of an affront offered to a Russian ambassador in the reign of queen Ann, though less analagous, shews, in a general view, the solemnity with which reparation is made, for insults having immediate relation to the sovereignty of a nation. —Although the principle which was outraged in the proceedings against the American frigate is independent of the question concerning the allegiance of the seamen taken from her, the fact that they were citizens of the U. States, and not British subjects, may have such an influence on the feelings of all, and perhaps on the opinions of some unacquainted with the laws and usages of nations, that it has been thought proper to seek more regular proofs of their national character than were deemed sufficient in the first instance. These proofs will be added by this conveyance, if obtained in time, if not by the first that succeeds.—The president has an evident right to expect from the British government, not only an ample reparation to the U. States, in this case, but that it will be decided without difficulty or delay. Should this expectation fail, and above all, should reparation be refused, it will be incumbent on you to take proper measures for hastening home, according to the degree of urgency, all American vessels remaining in British ports; using for the purpose, the mode least likely to awaken the attention of the British government. Where there may be no ground to distrust the prudence or fidelity of consuls, they will probably be found the fittest vehicles for your intimations. It will be particularly requisite to communicate to our public ships in the Mediterranean the state of appearances, if it be such as ought to influence their movements.—All negociation with the British government on other subjects, will of course be suspended until satisfaction on this be so pledged and arranged as to render negociation honorable. Whatever may be the result or the prospect, you will please to forward to us the earliest information.—The scope of the proclamation will signify to you that the president has yielded to the presumption that the hostile act of the British commander did not pursue the intentions of his government. It is not indeed easy to suppose that so rash and so critical a step should have originated with the admiral, but it is still more difficult to believe, that such orders were prescribed by any government, under circumstances such as existed between G. Britain and the U. States.—Calculations founded on dates, are also strongly opposed to the supposition, that the orders in question could have been transmitted from England. In the same scale, are to be put the apparent and declared persuasion of the British representative, Mr. Erskine, that no orders of a hostile spirit, could have been issued or authorised by his government; and the coincidence of this assurance with the amicable professions of Mr.

Canning, the organ of the new administration, as stated in the dispatch of April 22d, from yourself and Mr. Pinckney.—Proceeding on these considerations, the president has inferred that the justice and honor of the British government will readily make the atonement required: and in that expectation, he has forborne an immediate call of congress; notwithstanding the strong wish which has been manifested by many, that measures depending on their authority, should without delay be adopted. The motives to this forbearance, have at the same time been strengthened by the policy of avoiding a course which might stimulate the British cruizers, in this quarter, to arrest our ships and seamen now arriving and shortly expected in great numbers from all quarters. It is probable however that the legislature will be convened in time to receive the answer of the British government on the subject of this dispatch, or even sooner, if the conduct of the British squadron here, or other occurrences, should require immediate measures beyond the authority of the executive.—In order to give the more expedition and security to the present dispatch, a public armed vessel, the Revenge, is specially employed; and doctor Bullus is made the bearer, who was on board the Chesapeake, on his way to a consulate in the Mediterranean, and will be able to detail and explain circumstances which may possibly become interesting in the course of your communications with the British government.--The vessel, after depositing doctor Bullus at a British port, will proceed with dispatches to a French port, but will return to England with a view to bring the result of your transactions with the British government. The trip to France will afford you and Mr. Pinckney a favorable opportunity of communicating with our ministers at Paris, who being instructed to regulate their conduct on the present occasion by the advices they may receive from you, will need every explanation that can throw light on the probable turn and issue of things with G. Britain.

MR. CANNING TO MR. MUNROE, JULY 25, 1807.

Mr Canning presents his compliments to Mr. Munroe; and with sentiments of the deepest regret, hastens to inform him that intelligence has just been received of a transaction which has taken place off the coast of America, between a ship of war of his majesty, and a frigate belonging to the U. States; the result of which has been the loss of some lives on board of the American frigate.—The particulars of this transaction and the grounds of the justification of the British officer, and of the admiral under whose orders he acted, Mr. C. is not at present able to communicate to Mr. Munroe.—If Mr. Munroe should have received any accounts of it, Mr. C. trusts that he will lose no time in communicating them to Mr. C.—But whatever the real merits and character of the transaction may turn out to be, Mr. C. could not forbear expressing without delay the sincere concern and sorrow which he feels at its unfortunate result; and assuring the American minister, both from himself and on the behalf of his majesty's government, that if the British officers should prove to have been culpable, the most prompt and effectual reparation shall be afforded to the government of the U. States.

MR. MUNROE TO MR. CANNING, JULY 27, 1807.

Mr. Munroe presents his compliments to Mr. Canning, and is much obliged to him for the information communicated in his note of Saturday. Mr. M. has heard with extreme regret the account it contains of a rencontre between a British ship of war and an American frigate off the coast of the U. States. He has no knowledge of the subject except what Mr. C.'s note has furnished, but will not fail to communicate the earliest intelligence which he may receive of an event so deeply to be lamented. Mr. M. derives in the mean time much satisfaction from the friendly assurance of Mr. C. that this unfortunate occurrence was not authorised by his majesty's government, and that suitable reparation will be made for the injury, if on enquiry the British officer shall be found the aggressor.

MR. MUNROE TO MR. CANNING, JULY 29, 1807.

Sir;—Although I have no instruction from my government on the subject, it is my duty to request the attention of his Britannic majesty's government to the late aggression on the sovereignty of the U. States, of a very extraordinary nature. The circumstances of the transaction are too distinctly marked to leave any doubt of the extent of the outrage, or of the reparation which it obviously claims. By accounts which are entitled to full confidence, it appears that on the 23d of June last, his majesty's ship Leopard attacked an American frigate off the coast of the U. States, with a view to assert and enforce the unfounded and most unjustifiable pretension to search for deserters, and after having killed and wounded a num-

ber of her men, entered on board and carried away, forcibly, several of the crew. The conduct of the British officer, which in itself forms an act of complete hostility, is rendered more reprehensible from the consideration that just before this aggression he held a station within the jurisdiction of the U. States, in the waters of the Chesapeake, where, while he enjoyed the rights of hospitality, he projected this attack against the ship of a neutral power, whose commander relying on the good faith of his majesty's government, and the friendly relations subsisting between G. Britain and the U. States, could not have suspected the design. I might state other examples of great indignity and outrage, many of which are of recent dates, to which the U. States have been exposed off their coast, and even within several of their harbours, from the British squadron; but it is improper to mingle them with the present more serious cause of complaint. I have called your attention to this subject, in full confidence that his majesty's government will see in the act complained of, a flagrant abuse of its own authority, and that it will not hesitate to enable me to communicate to my government without delay, a frank disavowal of the principle on which it was made, and its assurance that the officer who is responsible for it, shall suffer the punishment which so unexampled an aggression on the sovereignty of a neutral nation justly deserves.

MR. CANNING TO MR. MUNROE, AUGUST 3, 1807.

Sir;—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your official note of the 29th ult. which I have lost no time in laying before the king.—As the statement of the transaction to which this note refers, is not brought forward either by the authority of the government of the U. States, or with any precise knowledge of the facts on which it is founded, it might have been sufficient for me to express to you, his majesty's readiness to take the whole of the circumstances of the case, when fully disclosed, into his consideration, and to make reparation for any alledged injury to the sovereignty of the U. States, whenever it should be clearly shewn that such injury has been actually sustained, and that such reparation is really due.—Of the existence of such a disposition on the part of the British government, you, sir, cannot be ignorant: I have already assured you of it, though in an unofficial form, by the letter which I addressed to you on the first receipt of the intelligence of this unfortunate transaction: and I may perhaps be permitted to express my surprize, after such an assurance, at the tone of that representation which I have just had the honor to receive from you.—But the earnest desire of his majesty to evince, in the most satisfactory manner, the principles of justice and moderation, by which he is uniformly actuated, has not permitted him to hesitate in commanding me to assure you, that his majesty neither does, nor has at any time, maintained the pretension of a right to search ships of war, in the national service of any state, for deserters.—If therefore the statement in your note, should prove to be correct, and to contain all the circumstances of the case, upon which complaint is intended to be made, and if it shall appear that the act of his majesty's officers rested on no other grounds than the simple and unqualified assertion of the pretension above referred to, his majesty has no difficulty in disavowing that act, and will have no difficulty in manifesting his displeasure at the conduct of his officers.—With respect to the other causes of complaint [whatever they may be] which are hinted at in your note, I perfectly agree with you, in the sentiment which you express, as to the propriety of not involving them in a question, which is of itself of sufficient importance to claim a separate and most serious consideration.—I have only to lament, that the same sentiment did not induce you to abstain from alluding to these subjects, on an occasion which you were, yourself, of opinion, was not favorable for pursuing the discussion of them.

MR. MUNROE TO MR. MADISON, AUGUST 4, 1807.

SIR;—I avail myself of the opportunity afforded by Mr. Biddle, to communicate to you a copy of a correspondence, and the substance of a conference between Mr. Canning and myself, relative to the late aggression on the grace and sovereignty of the U. States, by the British ship Leopard, in an attack on the Chesapeake, off the capes of Virginia.—Mr. Canning's private letter of July 25, which gave the first intelligence of the occurrence, left it doubtful whether the British officers had been culpable in it, and as I knew how very reprehensible their conduct had been on our coast, on many other occasions, and to what height the sensibility of our citizens had been excited by it, I thought it not improbable that something might have occurred to divide the blame between the parties. It was under that impression that my answer was written. On the next day the leading features of the transaction were presented to the public through the medium of the gazettes, which were taken from private accounts received

directly from Halifax, by a vessel which had been dispatched by admiral Berkley with the official one. By these it was evident that the British officer was completely the aggressor, in an outrage of great enormity, attended with circumstances which increased the offence. It was understood likewise from good authority, that the official intelligence which the government had received, corresponded with and confirmed the other accounts already before the public. —On full consideration of these circumstanstances, I concluded that it would be highly improper for me to leave the affair on the ground on which Mr. Canning had placed it. I could see no other motive in him to obtain further information relative to the transaction, than for the purpose of ascertaining whether the men said to be deserters, and for whom the attack was made, were American citizens or British subjects; to which it was impossible for me to give any countenance.—I thought it indispensible therefore to call on the government to disavow the principle and to engage such other reparation to the U. States, as their injured honor obviously required. It appeared to me, that any delay in taking that step, which depended on an abstract principle, and required no argument to illustrate, or facts to support it, would have a tendency to weaken a claim which was unquestionable, and to countenance the idea that it would not be supported with suitable energy. —I had, before the knowledge of this event, obtained the appointment of an interview with Mr. Canning on other business, to take place on the 29th ult. We met according to the appointment; I observed, in opening the conference, that although the topics which had brought us together, were important, the late occurrence at the entrance of the Chesapeake, had in a great measure put them out of sight. He expressed his regret that such an event, which would at all times furnish cause of concern, should have happened at the present time. He asked if the men in question were American citizens, or British subjects? I replied that that was a point which could not come into view in the case: that it was one which according as the fact might be, would make the cause more or less popular, in either country, but could not affect the principle: that on principle, a ship of war protected all the people on board, and could not be entered to be searched for deserters, or for any purpose, without violating the sovereignty of the nation whose flag she bore; that in the present case I had been assured, that the men were American citizens, and that the British minister at Washington had been made acquainted with it. He said little on the subject, but by the tendency of what he did say, seemed to imply that his government could not lose sight of the consideration above alluded to, nor indeed did he admit by any thing that escaped him, that the abstract principle itself would not be insisted on. His remarks however were generally of a conciliatory and friendly character; without pledging himself on any point, he seemed desirous to satisfy me, that no new orders had been issued by the present ministry to the commandant of the British squadron at Halifax. I observed, that as the notes which had passed between us, were informal, and on a very limited view of the subject, on my part, it would be proper for me, now, that the circumstances were better known, to present him an official note on it; he admitted the propriety of it.—I then drew Mr. Canning's attention to the subjects on which I had asked the interview; being the case of the Impetueux, captain Love's correspondence, the conduct of capt. Douglas, and of the British squadron generally on our coast. I observed that I had heretofore postponed any official communication on these points, from a desire to connect them with the greater objects depending between our governments, and of course, from motives the most friendly:—that I brought them to his view at this time, in consequence of Mr. Pinckney and myself having commenced other business, as he knew had been done, he promised to attend to them.—On the 29th July, I wrote Mr. Canning the note which I had promised him in the late interview: I addressed it in terms which I thought suitable to the occasion, observing to state in it, that I took the step from a sense of duty, applicable to my station as the resident minister, and without authority from my government: I considered the act as that of the British officer, in which the government had no agency, was not bound to support, and which it would be honorable for it to disavow. I flattered myself that some advantage might arise from the measure, and that under the circumstance in which it was taken, no injury possibly could. His reply is dated on the 3d inst. which though addressed in rather a harsh tone, may be considered as conceding essentially the point desired. It is my intention to say nothing more to him on the subject, 'till I hear from you, and in the mean time to observe the most conciliatory conduct that circumstances will admit.—Such is the state of this country, at the present crisis, that it is impossible

to foresee what will be its course of conduct towards the U. States. There has been at all times since the commencement of the present war, a strong party here for extending its ravages to them. This party is composed of the ship owners, the navy, the East and West India merchants, and several political characters of great consideration in the state. So powerful is this combination, that it is most certain that nothing can be obtained of the government on any point, but what may be extorted by necessity. The disasters to the north ought to inspire moderation, but with respect to the northern powers, it seems to have produced directly the opposite effect. A fleet of about 25 ships of the line, with a suitable number of frigates, &c. and above 20,000 men, has been lately equipped, and sent to the Baltic, as it is said, to take possession of the Danish and Russian navies. This measure is imputed to an understanding which it is supposed has been established between the cabinets of Russia and Paris by the late peace, and which has for its object a concert of measures for the purpose of attempting to force on this country a maritime code, more favorable to neutral nations. The motive assigned for the expedition, is that of taking possession of the Danish fleet, to keep it out of the hands of the French; that the Russian fleet is one of the objects is not so generally believed, though perhaps not less probable.—Mr. Pinckney and myself have taken the first step in our business. We will write you in a few days the state of it. You may be assured that we shall do every thing in our power to promote, in the mode most likely to succeed, the object of our instructions, and the interests of our country. Want of time prevents my going into further detail.

MR. CANNING TO MR. MUNROE, AUGUST 8, 1807.

SIR;—Having received from his majesty's minister in America, an unofficial printed paper, purporting to be a copy of a proclamation of the president of the U. States, I have to request that you will be pleased to acquaint me, whether you have received any communication from your government which enables you to pronounce if such paper be authentic?—In the event of your being empowered to admit its authenticity, I have further to request of you, that you will inform me whether you are also authorized to announce it to be the intention of the government of the U. States to carry into effect the measures stated in the proclamation of the president, without requiring, or waiting for, any explanation, on the part of the British government, with respect to the late unfortunate transaction, upon which the determination to resort to these measures is professed to be founded?

MR. MUNROE TO MR. CANNING, AUGUST 9, 1807.

SIR;—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of yesterday, and should not hesitate to communicate the information which you have desired, if I possessed it; but as I have not heard from my government on the subject of the unfortunate occurrence alluded to, it is not in my power to state to you any thing on the part of my government respecting it. I have no doubt that I shall be instructed in a very few days, to make a communication to his majesty's government, on that highly interesting event, in which I shall be enabled to furnish a full and just view of all the circumstances attending it. As soon as I receive instructions I shall hasten to apprize you of it.

MR. MUNROE TO MR. MADISON, AUGUST 14, 1807.

Sir;—I had the honour to transmit you with my letter of the 14th inst. a copy of a correspondence with Mr. Canning, relative to the late aggression in the case of the Chesapeake frigate. You will receive with this a copy of a more recent one on the same subject.—Mr. C.'s queries in his last note, I was led to consider as preparatory to an embargo on American vessels. I could not conceive why he should request information of me, whether the president's proclamation was authentic, and when it would be carried into effect, if it was not intended to found some measure on my reply of an unfriendly nature. The information desired was not necessary to remove any doubts of his government on the points to which it applied, or to enable it to do justice to the U. States, in regard to the aggression of which they complained. The presumption that an embargo was intended gained strength from the circumstance that most of the gazettes had recommended, and that the public mind seemed to be essentially prepared for it. It was my most earnest wish to prevent, as far as in my power, so unjust and pernicious a procedure. As the measure contemplated, whatever it might be, seemed to be suspended for my answer, I was extremely solicitous, by the manner, to deprive this government of all pretext for any measure of the kind alluded to. By replying generally that I had no instructions from my go-

vernment, and could state nothing on its part respecting the late occurrence, I avoided giving a direct answer to Mr. C.'s queries; and by drawing his attention to the application which it was to be presumed would soon be made on the part of my government, on that subject, I endeavoured to show more strongly the impolicy and injustice which would stamp any such measure on the part of G. Britain in the present stage.—No step has yet been taken by this government of an unfriendly character, towards the U. States; and from the communicatiou which Mr. C. made to the House of Commons, on the day he received my last note, which you will find in the gazettes sent, I am persuaded that things will remain in the state in which they are, till your dispatch is received. I trust that a disposition exists to make such reparation on the point in question, as will be satisfactory to the U. States, and that it will be practicable and not difficult to preserve the friendly relations subsisting between the two countries. The party, however, in favour of war, consisting of the combined interests mentioned in my last, is strong and active, so that it is impossible to foresee the result.

MR. MUNROE TO MR. CANNING, SEPTEMBER 7, 1807.

Sir;—By the order of my government it is my duty to request your attention to the aggression lately committed on the peace and sovereignty of the U. States, by his Britannic majesty's ship of war Leopard, in an attack on an American frigate, the Chesapeake, off the capes of Virginia. The object of this communication is to obtain of his majesty's government a suitable reparation for that outrage, and such an arrangement of the great interest which is connected with it, as will place the future relations of the two powers on a solid foundation of peace and friendship.—In bringing this subject again to the view of his majesty's government, it is unnecessary to dwell on circumstances which are already so well known to you. By the documents which I have the honour to transmit you, it is shown that while the outrage was unprovoked and unexpected on one side, there was nothing to extenuate it on the other. The commander of his majesty's squadron on the coast of the U. States, appears to have acted on a presumption that he possessed the power to make war, and to decide on the causes of war. It will be difficult to explain the conduct of that officer on any other principle; and equally so to find an example of an aggression marked with such high indignity and injustice to a friendly power.—The pretext of this aggression could not fail to heighten the sense of injury which the act itself was so signally calculated to excite. My government was taught to infer from it, that there was no limit to a pretension which had already produced so much mischief, and against which so many remonstrances had been presented, in its application to merchant vesseis. But I find with great satisfaction that this pretension forms no topic for discussion between us in respect to ships of war; and I trust that the just and enlightened policy which produced the decision in one instance, will surmount the obstacle which has hitherto embarrassed it in the other.—The national character of the men who were taken thus violently from on board the Chesapeake, makes no part of the question. It is impossible that it should come into view in estimating the injury which the U. States have received. The outrage involves a great and uncontested principle, which ought not, in any view, to be affected by appealing to national sensibilities on either side, I have however the honour to transmit you documents which will, I presume, satisfy you that they were American citizens.—With respect to the reparation which my government ought to receive for this outrage it will only be necessary to appeal to those sentiments which G. Britain would be sure to indulge, under like circumstances: to that sensibility to national honour, which has distinguished so many epochs of her history.—It will be recollected that the injury which in itself was great, was much aggravated by the circumstances which attended it; that the peaceful relations of the U. States were violated, and their unsuspecting confidence surprized. But I forbear to recite details which it is painful to contemplate. You will, I am persuaded, be satisfied, that in every light in which the subject can be seen, the honour of my government and of the whole nation has been greatly outraged by the aggression, and that it becomes the honour of his majesty's government to make a distinguished reparation for it.—In presenting, in this friendly manner, this important subject to the consideration of his majesty's government, I am particularly instructed to request its attention to the great cause to which this, and so many other injuries of a like kind may be traced; the impressment of men from the merchant vessels of the U. States. In many essential circumstances the objections which are applicable to impressments from ships of war, are equally applicable to those from merchant vessels. To the individuals who suffer by

the practice, the injury is the same in either case. Their claim on their government for protection is in both cases equal: every maxim of public law, and private right, which is violated in one, is equally violated in the other. The relation of the belligerent to the neutral power, extends to certain objects only, and is defined in each by known laws. Beyond that limit, the rights of the neutral are sacred, and cannot be encroached on without violence and injustice. Is there a question of contraband; is the vessel destined to a blockaded port in violation of established principles; or does she contain enemy's property; the greatest extent to which the maritime law is carried by any nation? In these cases, she is conducted to port for trial; the parties are heard by an impartial and responsible tribunal, and are heard again by appeal if they desire it. Are any of the passengers on board the neutral vessel in the naval or military service of the enemy? If such are found they are made prisoners, but as prisoners they have rights which the opposite belligerent is bound to respect. This practice however looks to other objects than are here recited. It involves no question of belligerent on one side, and of neutral on the other. It pursues the vesssel of a friend for an unlawful purpose, which it executes in a manner equally unlawful. Every commercial vessel of the U. States that navigates the ocean, is liable to be invaded by it, and not an individual on board any of them is secure while the practice is maintained. It sets up every officer of his majesty's navy as a judge, from whose decision there is no appeal. It makes him a judge, not of property, which is held more sacred, nor of the liberty of his fellow subjects only, however great the trust, and liable to abuse on the main ocean, but of that of the citizens of another power, whose rights as a nation, are trampled on by the decision: a decision, in rendering which, every rule of evidence is violated, as it puts the proof of innocence on the accused; and is further highly objectionable, as there is too much reason to believe that it has been often guided more by the fitness of the party for service, than any other circumstance. The distressing examples of this system of aggression, as it has affected individuals, on a scale of vast extent, it is unnecessary to recount here. They may be easily imagined. Voluminous documents which prove them, are in the possession of both governments.—It is possible that this practice may in certain cases, and under certain circumstances, have been extended to the vessels of other powers; but with them there was an infallible criterion to prevent error. It would be easy to distinguish between an Englishman and a Spaniard, an Italian, or a Swede: and the clear and irresistable evidence of his national character, and perhaps of his desertion, would establish the British claim to the individual, and reconcile the nation into whose service he had entered to his surrender. But the very circumstances which would constitute an infallible criterion in those cases, would be sure to produce endless error in the other. Who is so skilful in physiognomy as to distinguish between an American and an Englishman, especially among those whose profession and whose sea terms are the same? It is evident that this practice as applied to a foreign nation, to any great extent, has grown out of the American revolution, and that it is impossible for the U. States not to see in it the assertion of a claim which is utterly incompatible with that great event. When the character of this claim, and the pernicious tendency of the practice, are maturely weighed, it must furnish cause for surprize, that some just and friendly arrangement, has not long since been adopted, to prevent the evils incident to it.—My government is aware that his majesty's government has also an interest of importance to attend to, in this delicate concern—and I am instructed to state, on its part, that the best disposition exists to provide for it. The U. States are far from desiring to profit of a resource which does not belong to them, especially to the prejudice of a friendly power. In securing them against a practice, which is found to be so highly injurious to their dearest rights, and most valuable interests, every suitable provision will be made to give equal security to those of G. Britain. On this point I am authorized to enter into such an engagement as will I am persuaded, be adequate to the object.—This great interest of impressment, has been blended in all its relations, as you will perceive, by no act of the U. States. Its connection with the late disastrous incident has been produced by an extraordinary act of violence, of which they were the victims only. That act, which exhibits the pretension in its widest range, has become identified with the general practice in the feelings and sympathies of the nation, and in the sentiment of the government. I trust therefore, that his majesty's government will be equally disposed to take

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up the whole subject at this time, and in making the reparation which the particular injury claims, provide a remedy for the whole evil. My government looks to this complete adjustment with confidence as being indispensably necessary to heal the deep wound which has been inflicted on the national honour of the U. States by so great and unjustifiable an outrage.—I avail myself, with great satisfaction, of the opportunity which this communication affords, to acknowledge the prompt assurance which you gave me of the disposition of his majesty's government, to make a suitable reparation to the government of the U. States for the injury, of which, by its order, it is now my duty to complain; and for the frank disavowal of the pretension on which it was founded. I hastened to transmit copies of those documents to my government, by whom, I trust, they are by this time received.

Mr. Munroe to Mr. Canning, Sept. 9, 1807.

Mr. Munroe presents his compliments to Mr. Canning, and has the honour to inform him that he called at his office yesterday, for the purpose of making some remarks on the subject treated in the note which he addressed, on the 7th. ins. to Mr. C. Mr. M. regrets that he had not the pleasure of seeing Mr. C. at that time, and requests that he will be so good as to give him an interview to morrow, at such hour as may be most convenient to him. Mr. M. will be happy to attend Mr. C. in the country, should it be more agreeable to Mr. C. to receive him there.

Mr. Canning to Mr. Munroe, Sept. 9, 1807.

Mr. Canning presents his compliments to Mr. Monroe; and will be happy to have the honour of seeing him at the foreign office tomorrow at twelve o'clock. Mr. C. has but this moment received Mr. M.'s note.

Mr. Munroe to Mr. Madison, Sept. 16, 1807.

Sir,—I had the honour to receive your letter of July 6th by Dr. Bullus on the 31st ult. and did not lose a moment in entering on the business communicated to me by it, in the manner which seemed most likely to obtain success. The details shall be communicated to you in my next dispatch. All that I can state at present is, that the whole subject has been placed fully before this government in as strong an appeal to its interest and judgement as I could make; and that as a week has elapsed since my official note was presented, I am in daily expectation of receiving its decision on it. The moment is in many views very favourable to a satisfactory result, but still is not in my power, from any thing that has occurred, to speak with confidence of it. The joint negociation committed to Mr. Pinckney and myself, was suspended by the intelligence of the affair with our frigate, and has never been revived since. That intelligence reached this about a week after Mr. Purviance, so that we had only been able with the utmost diligence, to take the preliminary step of presenting to Mr. Canning, in conformity to our instructions, a project, and of explaining to him in the most minute and comprehensive manner that we could, every circumstance appertaining to it. No answer was given to our communication; the suspension therefore of the negociation was imputable to Mr. Canning; had he answered our communication and proposed to proceed in our negociation, it would have become a question for the commission to have decided, how far it would have been proper under existing circumstances to comply with the invitation; his silence however relieved us from that dilemma. Permit me to present to you, Mr. Jos. A. Smith of South Carolina, and to refer you to him for much information, of a general nature, on the subject of our affairs with this country. Having been long in Europe, and visited almost every part; he possesses great information of the political state of its several powers, especially of Russia, from whose sovereign he received very distinguished marks of attention. In much communication which I have had with Mr. Smith for a year past, I have found him to be animated with strong sentiments of patriotism towards his country, and as he has expressed a desire of being personally known to the president, and yourself, I have been happy to promote his object, by giving him this introduction.

Mr. Canning to Mr. Munroe, Sept. 23, 1807.

Sir—I have laid before the king my master, the letter which I had the honour to receive from you, on the 8th of this month. Before I proceed to observe upon that part of it which relates more immediately to the question now at issue between our two governments, I am commanded, in the first instance, to express the surprise which is felt at the total omission of a subject, upon which, I had already been commanded to apply to you for information: the proclamation purported to have been issued by the president of the U. States. Of this paper,

when I last addressed you upon it, you professed not to have any knowledge, beyond what the ordinary channels of public information afforded, nor any authority to declare it to be authentic. I feel it an indispensable duty to renew my inquiry on this subject. The answer which I may receive from you is by no means unimportant to the settlement of the discussion which has arisen from the encounter between the Leopard and the Chesapeake. The whole of the question arising out of that transaction, is, in fact, no other than a question as to the amount of reparation due by his majesty for the unauthorized act of his officer: and you will, therefore, readily perceive that, in so far as the government of the U. States have thought proper to take that reparation into their own hands, and to resort to measures of retaliation previously to any direct application to the British government, or to the British minister in America, for redress: in so far the British government is entitled to take such measures into account, and to consider them in the estimate of reparation which is acknowledged to have been originally due. The total exclusion of all ships of war belonging to one of the two belligerent parties, while the ships of war of the other were protected by the harbours of the neutral power, would furnish no light ground of complaint against that neutral, if considered in any other point of view, than as a measure of retaliation for a previous injury: and, so considered, it cannot but be necessary to take it into account in the adjustment of the original dispute. I am, therefore, distinctly to repeat the inquiry, whether you are now enabled to declare, sir, that the proclamation is to be considered as the authentic act of your government? And, if so, I am further to inquire, whether you are authorised to notify the intention of your government to withdraw that proclamation, on the knowledge of his majesty's disavowal of the act which occasioned its publication. The light in which you are directed to represent admiral Berkley's conduct, and the description which you give of the character of the measure imputed to him—that "he acted "as if he had the power to make war, and "to decide the causes of war;" sufficiently evince the necessity of comprehending in this discussion, all the circumstances which have led to, or have followed the action with the Chesapeake. Undoubtedly the attack upon a national ship of war, is an attack of hostility, and the very essence of the charge against admiral Berkley as you represent it, is the having taken upon himself to commit an act of hostility without the previous authority of his government. The provocation which may have led to such an act, without such previous authority, if it cannot justify, may possibly extenuate it: as the steps which have been taken in reprisal though they cannot alter the character of the original act, may and do materially affect every question concerning the reparation claimed for it. On this ground it is, that, while I am commanded to repeat to you (what you consider as so satisfactory) that the general and unqualified pretensions to search ships of war for deserters, is not asserted by this country, I am precluded from concurring in the inference, "that therefore "the national character of the men who "were violently taken from on board the "Chesapeake, makes no part of the present "question." If the right to search ships of war for deserters is not insisted upon by this country, it is not because the employment and the detention of British mariners on board the national ships of any state are considered as less injurious towards G. Britain than their employment on board merchant vessels (a proposition which would be manifestly absurd:) it is not intended to allow that the sailors of G. Britain may be justly employed, against her consent, in foreign ships of war; but merely that redress is, in that case, to be sought for by government from government; and not to be summarily enforced by the unauthorized officer of any of his majesty's ships of war. It follows from this reasoning, that not only the "national character" of the men taken out of the Chesapeake is matter for consideration; but that the reparation to be made by the British government to that of the U. States, would depend, among other circumstances, on the question whether an act, which the British government would be justified in considering as an act of hostility, had been committed by the government of the U. States (in refusing to discharge the British seamen in their national service) previously to commission of an act of hostility of an officer of his majesty.——The act of the British officer would still be an unauthorized act, and as such liable to complaint and disapprobation; but the case, as between government and government, would be materially varied.——At the same time that I offer to you this explanation of the principles upon which his majesty has authorized me to discuss with you the subject of your representation, and that I renew to you the assurances of the disposition to conduct the discussion in the most amicable form, and to bring it to a conclusion satisfactory to the honour and to the feelings of

both countries; it is matter of regret that you should have been instructed to annex to the demand of reparation for the attack of the Leopard upon the Chesapeake, any proposition whatever respecting the search for British seamen in merchant vessels; a subject, which is wholly unconnected with the case of the Leopard and the Chesapeake, and which can only tend to complicate and embarrass a discussion, in itself of sufficient delicacy and importance. ——In stating the grounds upon which your government expect with confidence that "the whole subject of impressment shall "be taken up at this time," and that in making the reparation which is claimed for the particular injury alledged to have been sustained by the U. States, in the late unfortunate transaction off the capes of Virginia, "a remedy shall be provided for the whole evil," you appear to have been directed to assume that this act of violence (such as you describe it) is the natural and almost necessary result of the practice of impressment of British seamen from the merchant vessels of other states; and to represent the particular transaction and the general question of impressment, as "identified in the feelings and sympathies of "your nation, as well as in the sentiment of "your government."——With every attention due to the feelings of the people of the U. States, I am sure you will readily allow that those feelings cannot properly be considered as affecting the merits of the case.——The first ebullitions of national sensibility may very naturally have communicated an impulse to the proceedings of the American government; but it cannot be expected, that they should guide the deliberate opinions and conduct of the government with which you have to treat. I would further observe to you that your government cannot reasonably claim any advantage in argument from the expressed sense of its own people, unless it be prepared at the same time to take upon itself a responsibility (which there is no desire of attributing to it) for the outrage and indecency, with which upon the late occasion, that expression has in too many instances been accompanied. It is better for temperate reasoning, and assuredly it is more advantageous for the government of the United States, that the consideration of popular feelings should be wholly omitted in this discussion.——The right and the practice of which you are instructed to complain, as irreconcileable with justice, and intolerable in all their parts, have been exercised by G. Britain from the earliest ages of the British naval power, even without any qualification or exception in favour of national ships of war.——The grounds upon which such a distinction has been admitted in latter times, and upon which, for the course of nearly a century, the crown has forborn to instruct the commanders of its ships of war, to search foreign ships of war for deserters, I have already had the honour to explain to you:—And you will have perceived that those grounds are wholly inapplicable to ships in the merchant service.——That a foreign power will not, knowingly, retain in its national service, mariners natural born subjects of his majesty, who have been recalled by public proclamation, may be regarded as a presumption arising out of the hostile nature of the act, and out of the probable consequences to which such an act of hostility must lead. But with respect to merchant vessels, there is no such presumption. When mariners subjects of his majesty, are employed in the private service of foreign individuals, under private civil contracts, the king's subjects, and the foreign individuals with whom they serve, enter into engagements inconsistent with the duty of his majesty's subjects towards him: but to those engagements the government of the foreign nation has not made itself a party. In such cases, the species of redress which the practice of all times has admitted and sanctioned, is that of taking those subjects at sea, out of the service of such foreign individuals; and recalling them to the discharge of that previous and paramount duty which they owe to their sovereign and to their country.—That the exercise of this right involves some of the dearest interests of G. Britain, your government is ready to acknowledge, and has accordingly authorized you to propose certain regulations, which you apprehend would be equivalent in their effect for the preservation of the interests concerned.——There will be no indisposition here to entertain, at a proper time, the discussion of such proposed regulations. But when you recollect that many proposals to this effect have already been brought forward, and have been found wholly inadmissible: when you have, yourself, recently had occasion to experience the difficulty of framing any satisfactory arrangement upon the subject; with all the anxiety which is properly felt by both government for the speedy adjustment of the difference between them, and for the "healing of that deep wound "which you state to have been inflicted on "the national honour of the United States;" surely it is not well advised to make the termination of that difference, and the healing that wound, dependent wholly on

the complete success of an attempt which has already been made so often, and which has hitherto uniformly failed.——Your own reasoning shows, that you are aware of the more than ordinary difficulty which must attend any arrangement for the prevention of desertion between two nations whose similarity of manners and habits, and whose identity of language, interpose so many impediments to the discrimination of " na- " tional character "——To these circumstances and not (as you almost seem to insinuate) to any peculiar harshness towards the U. States, it is owing, that the exercise of this right, as with respect to them, is necessarily more frequent, than with respect to any other nation; and is felt by them to be more rigid and vexatious. But these circumstances cannot furnish an argument for the suspension of the exercise of the right with respect to America; unless it be contended, that multiplicity of frauds and difficulty of detection are reasons against suspicion or motives for acquiescence——As little foundation is there for the complaint that the practice has grown out of the recognition of American independence; and that the character of that event is affected by its continuance.——It is needless to repeat that these rights existed in their fullest force, for ages previous to the establishment of the U. States as an independent government: and it would be difficult to contend that the recognition of that independence can have operated any change in this respect; unless it can be shown that in acknowledging the government of the U. States. G Britain virtually abdicated her own rights as a naval power: or unless there were any express stipulations, by which the ancient and prescriptive usages of G. Britain, founded in the soundest principles of natural law, though still enforced against other independent nations of the world, were to be suspended whenever they might come in contact with the interests or the feelings of the American people.——I would now recall your attention to the consideration of the question respecting the late transaction between the Leopard and the Chesapeake; which till the receipt of your letter, I imagine to be the only question actually in discussion between us, and in consideration of the delicacy and pressing importance of which, we had by common consent, waved the consideration of all other matters pending between our two governments.——Into the discussion of this question I am prepared to enter; with what disposition, on the part of his majesty's government, to consult the feelings and the honour of the U. States, it is not necessary for me here to declare—for you have yourself done justice to the sincerity of that disposition.——The difficulties in the way of such adjustment are already smoothed, by the disavowal voluntarily offered, at the very outset of the discussion, of the general and unqualified pretension to search ships of war for deserters. There remained only to ascertain the facts of the particular case and to proportion the reparation to the wrong.—— Is the British government now to understand, that you, sir, are not authorized to enter into this question separately and distinctly; without having obtained, as a preliminary concession, the consent of this country to enter into discussion with respect to the practice of searching merchant vessels for deserters?——Whether any arrangement can be devised by which this practice may admit of modification, without prejudice to the essential rights and interests of G. Britain, is a question which I have already said the British government may, at a proper season, be ready to entertain: but whether the consent of G. Britain to the entering into such discussion shall be extorted as the price of an amicable adjustment, as the condition of being admitted to make honourable reparation for an injury, is a question of quite a different sort, and one which can be answered no otherwise than by an unqualified refusal ——I earnestly recommend to you, therefore, to consider whether the instructions which you have received from your government, may not leave you at liberty to come to an adjustment of the case of the Leopard and the Chesapeake, independently of the other question with which it appears to have been unnecessarily connected.——If your instructions leave you no discretion, I cannot press you to act in contradiction to them. In that case there can be no advantage in pursuing a discussion which you are not authorized to conclude: and I shall have only to regret that the disposition of his majesty to terminate that difference amicably and satisfactorily is for the present rendered unavailing.—— In that case, his majesty in pursuance of the disposition of which he has given such signal proofs, will lose no time in sending a minister to America, furnished with necessary instructions and powers for bringing this unfortunate dispute to a conclusion consistent with the harmony subsisting between G. Britain and the U. States, but in order to avoid the inconvenience which has arisen, from the mixt nature of your instructions, that minister will not be empowered to entertain as connected with this subject, any proposition respecting the search of merchant vessels.——It will, however, be far more satisfactory to his majesty to learn, that upon

reconsideration, you think yourself authorized to separate the two questions.—— I hope you will allow me to express, at the same time, the sincere pleasure which I should feel in having to treat with you, sir, personally, for the re-establishment of a good understanding between our two countries.

Mr. Munroe to Mr Canning, Sept. 30, 1807.

Sir,——I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 23d of this month, and shall transmit it without delay to my government.——I perceive by it, with great regret, that his Britannic majesty's government is not disposed to enter into an arrangement at this time, of all the differences that have arisen between our governments, respecting the impressment of seamen from American vessels by British cruizers; that it is willing to look to one object only, the late aggression, and provide for it, while the other is left to depend on future adjustment. My government had presumed that his majesty's government would have seen in the recent and greater injury, a strong motive for bringing the whole subject into one view, and providing for it at the same time. The excesses of the latter outrage could not fail to revive in the mind of the suffering party, a high sense of former injuries, and it was reasonable to infer that the great injustice inseparable from the practice, of which the incident furnished so striking an example, would have produced between our governments the most prompt and friendly co-operation in the means of suppressing it. That the U. States have suffered a greater injury by a recent occurrence, than they had done before, cannot be a good reason, and ought not to be a motive for delaying redress of the others, especially when it is considered that they were already in a train of amicable accommodation and arrangement. Since, however, you inform me that his majesty's government is unwilling to take up the subject in a combined view, it is unnecessary for me to press it.—You ask whether I am authorised to separate this latter incident from the general practice, and to treat it as a distinct topic? On this point I have to state, that my instructions, which are explicit, enjoin me to consider the whole of this class of injuries as an entire subject; and indeed so intimately are they connected in their nature, that it seems to be difficult, if not impossible, to separate them for any useful purpose to either party. My government being sincerely desirous to place the relations of the two powers on the solid basis of permanent friendship, is satisfied, as well by what has occurred in the general practice, as by the more awful admonition derived from the late incident, that that can only be done with effect, by mounting to the source of the evil, and providing an adequate remedy for it. In pursuing this great object it is my duty to repeat, that my government does not seek to confine the remedy proposed to the injuries which the U. States have suffered, and continue to suffer, but is desirous to extend it to those also which are complained of by G. Britain. Experience has shewn that both parties complain of injuries, though certainly of a very different character and less urgent nature. How much more adviseable then is it not, in every view, for them to enter into an arrangement which shall provide an adequate remedy for their respective injuries; which shall bind the honour of each government to do what is just and right in respect to the other, and enlist the feelings of each nation on its side, than to suffer things to remain longer in their present state? How much more advantageous would not such an arrangement be likely to prove to G. Britain, in the particular object which she has in view, than her adherence to a practice which rejects a mean which could not fail to be more productive; a practice which cannot be maintained in principle; which leads by immutable causes, that ought to inspire different sentiments in the parties to each other, to great and constant abuse, and which is also considered by the U. States as subversive of their rights and degrading to their character as an independent power.—So much I have thought it proper to state, in order to place in a just light, the conduct of my government on the present occasion, on this great and very interesting subject of impressment. Well knowing its desire to cultivate the most friendly relations with G. Britain, on just and honourable conditions, it would be highly improper that any doubt should be suffered to exist on that point.—You inform me that his majesty has determined, in case my instructions do not permit me to separate the late aggression from the general practice of impressment, to transfer the business to the U. S. by committing it to a minister who shall be sent there with full powers to conclude it. To that measure I am far from being disposed to raise any obstacle, and shall immediately apprise my government of the decision to adopt it. Under such circumstances, I perfectly agree with you in the opinion, that it would be useless to pursue a discussion, which it would be impossible for me to bring to a satisfactory conclusion.—It is still my duty to give the explanation which you have desired, of the

motives which induced the president to adopt the measures announced in his proclamation, of the 2d July last. However great the injury which the U. S. had received by the aggression complained of, it is just that it should be shewn that the president did not lose sight in those measures of the friendly relations subsisting between the two powers. When the hostile nature of the attack on the Chesapeake, is taken into view, and the general conduct of the British squadron within the waters of the U. States, before and after the attack, I am persuaded that there was no limit to which the president would not have been justified in going, which he might have thought essential to the honour and safety of the nation. Before the attack, the British squadron had violated the jurisdiction of the U. S. by the impressment of men within it, whom the commander had refused to surrender; and after the attack the attitude which he assumed continued to be of a very menacing and hostile character. An act of hostility, it must be admitted, justifies any act of a like nature towards the party who commits it. The president, however, did not believe that his majesty's government had authorised the conduct of the British squadron, and his measures were evidently founded on that belief. They were marked by no circumstance of hostility, or of retaliation towards G. Britain; but were intended simply to preserve order within the jurisdiction of the U. S., to which end the removal of the British squadron without their limits became indispensable. After the acts of violence which had been committed by that squadron, it was impossible that it should remain longer there without increasing the irritation and widening the breach between the two nations, which it was the earnest object of the president to prevent. There certainly existed no desire of giving a preference in favour of the ships of war of one belligerent party to those of another. Before this aggression, it is well known, that his Britannic majesty's ships lay within the waters of the Chesapeake, and enjoyed all the advantages of the most favoured nation; it cannot therefore be doubted that my government will be ready to restore them to the same situation, as soon as it can be done consistently with the honour and rights of the U. S.—I cannot conclude this communication without expressing my earnest hope, that the differences, which have unhappily arisen between our governments, may soon be settled, on conditions honourable and satisfactory to both the parties. To have co-operated with you in the accomplishment of so great and useful a work, would have been highly gratifying to me. The disposition which you have brought to the discussion, and the sentiments which you communicated on the principal transaction, when the first intelligence of it was received, have inspired me with great confidence, that we should soon have been able to bring it to such a conclusion. To have been a party to it, would have terminated my mission to his majesty in the mode which I have long and sincerely desired.

MR. MUNROE TO MR. MADISON, OCT. 10, 1807.

SIR,—I have the honour to transmit you, by Doctor Bullus, a copy of my correspondence with Mr. Canning, on the subject which was committed to my care, by your letter of the 6th of July last. You will find by it, that the pressure which has been made on this government, in obedience to the instruction contained in that letter, has terminated in a decision to send a minister to the U. S., to adjust the business there. What the powers of that minister will be; whether it is intended to confine them to the sole object of reparation for the special outrage, or to extend them, in case the proposed separation of that from the general topic of impressment is admitted, to the latter object, it is not in my power to state. Mr. Canning has given me no information on that head in conference, and his note is not explicit on it. It states, that the minister who shall be sent to the U. S., to bring the dispute relative to the attack on the Chesapeake to a conclusion, shall not be empowered to entertain, as connected with that subject, any proposition respecting the search of merchant vessels—a presumption is authorised by those terms, that the minister will have power to treat on the general topic after the special one is arranged. But it is possible that that presumption may have been raised for some other purpose, or that the terms which excited it, were introduced merely to convey the idea that the mission should be confined to the special object.—In the discharge of this delicate and important trust, I thought that I should be able, more effectually, to promote its object, by opening the subject to Mr. Canning in conference than by an official note. As the attitude taken by my government, which was evidently supported by the whole nation, was of a very impressive nature, it seemed probable from the feverish state of the public mind here, in regard to us, that a tone of conciliation which would not weaken the pressure, would be more likely to succeed in obtaining the reparation desired, than an official

and peremptory demand. Under this impression, I had several conferences with Mr. Canning, the substance of which, in each, I will endeavour to state with precision. A knowledge of what passed in these interviews, in aid of that which is afforded by the correspondence, will enable you to form the most correct idea of the object of the proposed mission, that present circumstances will admit of.—The first interview, was on the 3d of Sept. as soon as it could be obtained, after the receipt of your letter of July 6th, which was on the 30th of Aug. I informed Mr. Canning, that as I wished the discussion in which we were about to enter, to terminate amicably and honourably to both our governments; I had asked the interview, for the purpose of promoting that desirable end; that by explaining to each other fully, in friendly conference, the views of our respective governments relative to the late aggression, I was persuaded that it would be more easy for us to arrange the business, to the satisfaction of both parties, than by any other mode which we could pursue. He expressed his sensibility to that which I had chosen, and his readiness to concur in it; I then stated in detail, in explicit terms, the reparation which my government thought the U. S entitled to, and expected that they should receive, for the injury and indignity offered by the late aggression; that the men taken from the frigate should be restored to it; that the officers who had committed the aggression should be exemplarily punished; that the practice of impressment from merchant vessels should be suppressed; and that the reparation consisting of those several acts should be announced to our government, through the medium of a special mission, a solemnity which the extraordinary nature of the aggression particularly required. I observed that as the aggression and the principle on which it was founded, had been frankly disavowed as soon as known, by his government, I was persuaded that there could be no serious objection on its part, to any of the acts which it was desired should constitute the proposed reparation: that to the first act, the restoration of the men, there could doubtless be none, as the least that could be done, after such an outrage, would be to replace the U. S. as far as it might be practicable, on the ground they held before the injury was received: that the punishment of the officers followed, as a necessary consequence, to the disavowal of the act: that the suppression of the practice of impressment from merchant vessels had been made indispensable by the late aggression, for reasons which were sufficiently well known to him. I stated to him that the mode in which it was desired that the reparation should be made, by a special mission, was that which had been adopted by other powers, and by G. Britain herself, for injuries less severe than the one alluded to, of which I gave him the examples furnished me in your letter of July 6th. Mr. Canning took a note of what I had stated, and made some general remarks on the whole subject, which were intended to give his view of it, on each point, but without compromising himself in a positive manner on any one. He said that, by the proclamation of the president, and the seizure and detention of some men who had landed on the coast to procure water, the government seemed to have taken redress into its own hands; he complained of the difference which he said had been made between France and England, by restoring deserters to the vessels of the former, and not the latter: he insisted that the late aggression was an act different in all respects from the former practice, and ought not to be connected with it, as it shewed a disposition to make a particular incident, in which they were in the wrong, instrumental to an accommodation in a case where his government held a different doctrine. I urged in reply, that the proclamation could not be considered as an act of hostility or retaliation for injuries, though the aggression had provoked and would have justified any the strongest act of reprisal, but as a mere measure of police, which had become indispensable for the preservation of order within the limits of the U. S.; I informed him that the men who had landed from the squadron, in defiance of the proclamation, and of the law on which it was founded, had been restored to it: that with respect to the other point in difference, said to be made in the case of deserters from British and French ships, I was unacquainted with the fact, but was satisfied, if the statement was correct, that the difference was imputable to the local authorities, and not to the national government, because as the U. S. were not bound by treaty to restore deserters from the service of either nation, it was not presumable that their government would interfere in the business. I observed, however, that if such a preference had been given, there was a natural and justifiable cause for it, proceeding from the conduct of the squadrons of France and England, on the coast of the U. S., and on the main ocean, it being a well known fact that the former did not maintain as a right or adopt in practice the doctrine of the latter, to impress seamen from our merchant vessels. I then discussed at length, and urged with great earnestness

the justice and policy of his terminating at this time all the differences which had arisen between our governments from this cause, by an arrangement which should suppress the practice on the part of G. Britain, and remedy the evil of which she complained.—In aid of those reasons which were applicable to the merits of the question, I urged the example given by the late ministry, in the paper of Nov. 8th, presented to Mr. Pinckney and myself, by the British commissioners, which had, as I thought, laid the foundation of such an arrangement. I stated that as it was stipulated by that paper, that the negociation should be kept open for the purpose of arranging this great interest, without prejudice to the rights of either power, it was fairly to be understood as the sense of both parties, that our rights were to be respected, till that arrangement was concluded; whence it would follow that the same effect would be produced in practice, as if it had been provided for by treaty. I relied on this paper and the construction which I thought it admitted, with which, however, the practice had since in no degree corresponded, to shew the extent to which the former ministry had gone in meeting the just views of our government, and thereby to prove that the present ministry in improving that ground had nothing to apprehend from the preceding one. Mr. Canning admitted that the view which I had taken of this paper derived much support from its contents, and the time and circumstances under which it was presented, but persisted in his desire to keep the subjects separate. I proposed, as an expedient to get rid of his objection, that we should take up and arrange both points informally, in which case provided it was done in a manner to be obligatory, I offered to frame my note which should demand reparation for the outrage, in general terms, so as that it should not appear by official document, that the subjects had any connection in the negociation. I urged that unless it was intended to make no provision against impressment from merchant vessels, I could see no objection to his meeting me on that ground, as after what had passed, it was impossible to take up either subject without having the other in view, and equally so to devise any mode which should keep them more completely separate, than that which I proposed. Mr. Canning still adhered to his doctrine of having nothing to do with impressment from merchant vessels, till the affair of the Chesapeake was disposed of, after which he professed his willingness to proceed to the other object. In this manner the conference ended, without having produced the arrangement which I had hoped from it. Mr. Canning's conduct was in all other respects conciliatory.—My note to Mr. C. was founded on the result of this conference. As it had not been in my power to come to any agreement with him on the general subject of impressment from merchant vessels, I considered it my duty to combine it with the affair of the Chesapeake, in the paper which I presented him to claim reparation for the outrage. I thought it best, however, to omit the other acts, of which it was desired that the reparation should consist. It seemed probable that a specification of each circumstance, in the note, would increase the indisposition of the ministry to accommodate, and give it support with the nation, in a complete rejection of the demand. I expressed myself therefore in regard to the other acts, in general and conciliatory terms, but with all the force in my power. The details had been communicated to Mr. C. in conference too recently to be forgotten. Still it was just that no improper inference should be drawn from the omission of them. To prevent it, I obtained an interview of Mr. C. immediately after my note was presented, in which, after reminding him of the omission alluded to, the motive to which I presumed he could not mistake, I added that my object in asking the interview had been to repeat to him informally, what I had stated in the former one, the other acts of which my government expected that reparation should consist. In this interview nothing occurred without the limit of the special object for which it had been obtained. Mr. C. did not lead the conversation to any other topic, and I could not invite it.—Mr. C.'s answer to my note was delayed more than a fortnight. Having refused to treat the subject in connection, and intimated in plain terms that if I was not authorised to separate them, it would be useless to prolong the discussion, I thought it improper to press it. My reply was equally explicit, so that with it the negociation ended. The measure which he announced, as being determined on by the king, in case I could not agree to the separation, is completely the act of his government. You will observe that it is announced in a form which precludes in a great degree, the idea of its being adopted at my suggestion, as an act of reparation, and in a tone of decision which seemed equally to preclude my holding any communication with him on it.—My mission being thus brought to an end, has afforded an opportunity for me to return to the U. S., as I have long desired. Nothing but the great interest which I take in the welfare

of my country, and my earnest desire to give all the aid in my power to the present administration, in support of the principles of our most excellent constitution, would have detained me here so long. In the present state, however, it is not possible, if in any it would be, for me to render any service by a longer continuance here. As soon, therefore, as I had answered Mr. C 's note, I communicated to him my intention to return, and requested that he would be so good as to obtain for me an audience of the king for the purpose of taking my leave of him. This was granted on the 7th of this month, in which I renewed the assurance of the sincere desire of my government, to preserve the most friendly relation between the U. S. and G. Britain, which sentiment was reciprocated by his majesty. Mr. Pinckney succeeds me by an arrangement with Mr Canning, which will appear in the enclosed copy of my correspondence with him, and which I have full confidence the president will approve. I regret that in transferring the business into his hands, I do not leave him altogether free from difficulty.

Now follows the Correspondence between Mr. MADISON *and* Mr. G. H. ROSE, *who was sent to America, upon the failure of the negociation with Mr. Munroe, in October, as above seen.*

MR. ROSE TO MR. MADISON, JANUARY 26, 1808.

Sir,—Having had the honour to state to you, that I am expressly precluded by my instructions from entering upon any negotiation for the adjustment of the differences arising from the encounter of his Majesty's ship Leopard, and the frigate of the U. States, the Chesapeake, as long as the proclamation of the president of the U. S., of the 2d July, 1807, shall be in force, I beg leave to offer you such farther explanation of the nature of that condition, as appears to me calculated to place the motives under which it has been enjoined to me thus to bring it forward in their true light.—In whatever spirit that instrument was issued, it is sufficiently obvious, that it has been productive of considerable prejudice to his majesty's interests as confided to his military and other servants in the U. S., to the honour of his flag, and to the privileges of his ministers accredited to the American government. From the operation of this proclamation have unavoidably resulted effects of retaliation and self assumed redress, which might be held to affect materially the question of the reparation due to the U. S., especially in as much as its execution has been persevered in after the knowledge of his majesty's early, unequivocal, and unsolicited disavowal of the unauthorized act of admiral Berkeley, his disclaiming of the pretension exhibited by that officer to search the national ships of a friendly power for deserters, and the assurances of prompt and effectual reparation, all communicated without loss of time, to the minister of the U. S. in London, so as not to leave a doubt as to his majesty's just and amicable intentions. But his maj., making every allowance for the irritation which was excited, and the misapprehensions which existed, has authorized me to proceed in the negotiation upon the sole discontinuance of measures of so inimical a tendency.—You are aware, sir, that any delay which may have arisen in the adjustment of the present differences, is not imputable to an intention of procrastination on the part of his majesty's government: on the contrary, its anxiety to terminate as expeditiously as possible the discussion of a matter so interesting to both nations, has been evinced by the communication made by Mr. secretary Canning, to Mr. Munroe, before the minister of the U. S. was even informed of the encounter, and now by the promptitude with which it has dispatched a special mission to this country for that express purpose.—I can have no difficulty in stating anew to you, with respect to the provisions of my instructions, calculated as they are to ensure an honourable adjustment of the important point in question, and to remove the impressions which the late cause of difference may have excited in the minds of this nation, that I am authorized to express my conviction, that they are such as will enable me to terminate the negotiations amicably and satisfactorily.—Having learnt from you, sir, that it is solely as a measure of precaution, the provisions of the proclamation are now enforced, I must persuade myself that a due consideration of his majesty's conduct in this transaction, will remove as well any misapprehensions which may have been entertained respecting his majesty's dispositions towards the U. S. as the grounds upon which that enforcement rests, and the more so, as it has long been a matter of notoriety that the orders issued to the officers of his majesty's navy, in his proclamation of 15th Oct. 1807, afford ample security that no attempt can be made to assert a pretension, which his maj. from the first disavowed.—I may add, that if his maj. has not commanded me to enter into a discussion of the other causes of complaint, stated to arise from the conduct of his naval commanders in these seas, prior to the en-

counter of the Leopard and the Chesapeake, it was because it had been deemed improper to mingle them, whatever may be their merits, with the present matter so much more interesting and important in its nature; an opinion, originally and distinctly expressed by Mr. Munroe, and assented to by Mr. sec. Canning. But if upon this more recent and more weighty matter of discussion upon which the proclamation mainly and materially rests, his majesty's amicable intentions are unequivocally evinced, it is sufficiently clear, that no hostile disposition can be supposed to exist on his part, nor can any views be attributed to his government, such as, requiring to be counteracted by measures of precaution, could be deducted from transactions which preceded that encounter.—In offering these elucidations, I should observe that the view in which I have brought forward the preliminary, which I have specified, is neither as to demand, concession or redress, as for a wrong committed: into such, the claim of a discontinuance of hostile provisions cannot be constructed; but it is simply to require a cessation of enactments injurious in their effects, and which, if persisted in, especially after these explanations, must evince a spirit of hostility, under which his maj. could not authorize the prosecution of the present negotiation, either consistently with his own honour, or with any well founded expectation of the renewal of duration of that good understanding between the two countries, which is equally the interest of both to foster and to ameliorate.

MR. MADISON TO MR. ROSE, MARCH 5, 1808.

Sir;—I have had the honor to receive and lay before the president, your letter of the 26th Jan. in which you state, that you are "expressly precluded by your instructions "from entering upon any negociation for "the adjustment of the differences arising "from the encounter of his Britannic ma-"jesty's ship Leopard, and the frigate of "the U. States, the Chesapeake, as long as "the proclamation of the president of the "2d of July, 1807, shall be in force."—This demand, sir, might justly suggest the simple answer, that before the proclamation of the president could become a subject of consideration, satisfaction should be made for the acknowledged aggression which preceded it. This is evidently agreeable to the order of time, to the order of reason, and, it may be added, to the order of usage, as maintained by G. Britain, whenever in analogous cases, she has been the complaining party.—But as you have subjoined to the preliminary demand, certain explanations, with a view doubtless to obviate such an answer, it will best accord with the candor of the president, to meet them with such a review of the whole subject, as will present the solid grounds on which he regards such a demand as inadmissible.—I begin with the occurrences from which the proclamation of July 2d, resulted. These are in general terms referred to, by the instrument itself. A more particular notice of the most important of them, will here be in place.—Passing over them, the habitual but minor irregularities of his Britannic majesty's ships of war, in making the hospitalities of our ports subservient to the annoyance of our trade, both outward and inward, a practice not only contrary to the principles of public law, but expressly contrary to British ordinances enforced during maritime wars, to which she bore a neutral relation, I am constrained, unwelcome as the task is, to call your attention to the following more prominent instances:—In the summer of 1804, the British frigate the Cambrian, with other cruizers in company, entered the harbour of New York. The commander, capt. Bradley, in violation of the port laws, relating both to health and revenue, caused a merchant vessel, just arrived, and confessedly within the limits and under the authority of the U. States, to be boarded by persons under his command, who, after resisting the officers of the port, in the legal exercise of their functions, actually impressed and carried off a number of seamen and passengers into the service of the ships of war. On an appeal to his voluntary respect for the laws, he first failed to give up the offender to justice, and finally repelled the officer charged with the regular process for the purpose.—This procedure was not only a flagrant insult to the sovereignty of the nation, but an infraction of its neutrality also, which did not permit a belligerent ship thus to augment its force within the neutral territory.—To finish the scene, this commander went so far as to declare, in an official letter, to the minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty, and by him communicated to this government, that he considered his ship, whilst lying in the harbour of New York, as having dominion around her, within the distance of her buoys.—All these circumstances were duly made known to the British government in just expectation of honorable reparation. None has ever been offered. Capt. Bradley was advanced from his frigate to the command of a ship of the line.—At a subsequent period, several British frigates under the command of capt. Whitby,

of the Leander, pursuing the practice of vexing the inward and outward trade of our ports, and hovering for that purpose about the entrance of that of New York, closed a series of irregularities, with an attempt to arrest a coasting vessel, on board of which an American citizen was killed by a cannon ball which entered the vessel, whilst within less than a mile from the shore.—The blood of a citizen thus murdered, in a trade from one to another port of his own country, and within the sanctuary of its territorial jurisdiction, could not fail to arouse the sensibility of the public, and to make a solemn appeal to the justice of the British government. The case was presented moreover to that government by this, in the accent which it required; and with due confidence that the offender would receive the exemplary punishment which he deserved. That there might be no failure of legal proof of a fact sufficiently notorious of itself, unexceptionable witnesses to establish it, were sent to G. Britain at the expense of the U. States.—Capt. Whitby was notwithstanding, honorably acquitted; no animadversion took place on any other officer belonging to the squadron; nor has any apology or explanation been made since the trial was over, as a conciliatory offering to the disappointment of this country at such a result.—A case of another character occurred in Sept. 1806. The Impetueux, a French ship of 74 guns, when aground within a few hundred yards of the shore of North Carolina, and therefore visibly within the territorial jurisdiction and hospitable protection of the U. States, was fired upon, boarded, and burnt, from three British ships of war under the command of capt. Douglas. Having completed this outrage on the sovereignty and neutrality of the U. States, the British commander felt no scruple in proceeding thence, into the waters near Norfolk, nor in the midst of the hospitalities enjoyed by him, to add to what had passed, a refusal to discharge from his ships, impressed citizens of the U. States, not denied to be such, on the plea, that the government of the U. States had refused to surrender to the demand of admiral Berkley, certain seamen alledged to be British deserters; a demand which it is well understood, your government disclaims any right to make. —It would be very superfluous to dwell on the features which mark this aggravated insult. But I must be permitted to remind you, that in so serious a light was a similar violation of neutral territory, by the destruction of certain French ships on the coast of Portugal, by a British squadron under the command of admiral Boscawen, regarded by the court of G. Britain that a minister extraordinary was dispatched for the express purpose of expiating the aggression on sovereignty of a friendly power. — Lastly presents itself, the attack by the British ship of war, Leopard, on the American frigate Chesapeake, a case too familiar in all its circumstances to need a recital of any part of them. It is sufficient to remark that the conclusive evidence, which this event added to that which had preceded, of the uncontrolled excesses of the British naval commanders in insulting our sovereignty and abusing our hospitality, determined the president to extend to all British armed ships, the precaution heretofore applied to a few by name, of interdicting to them the use and privileges of our harbours and waters.—This was done by his proclamation of July 2, 1807, referring to the series of occurrences, ending with the aggression on the frigate Chesapeake, as the considerations requiring it. And if the apprehension from the licentious spirit of the British naval commanders, thus developed and uncontrolled, which led to this measure of precaution, could need other justification than was afforded by what had passed, it would be amply found in the subsequent conduct of the ships under the command of the same captain Douglas.——This officer, neither admonished by reflexions on the crisis produced by the attack on the Chesapeake, nor controlled by respect for the law of nations or the laws of the land, did not cease within our waters to bring to, by firing at vessels pursuing their course of trade; and in the same spirit which had displayed itself in the recent outrage committed upon the American frigate, he not only indulged himself in hostile threats, and indications of a hostile approach to Norfolk, but actually obstructed our citizens in the ordinary communication between that and neighbouring places. His proceedings constituted in fact, a blockade of the port, and as real an invasion of the country, according to the extent of his force, as if troops had been debarked, and the town besieged on the land side.—Was it possible for the chief magistrate of a nation, who felt for its rights and its honour, to do less than interpose some measure of precaution, at least against the repetition of enormities which had been so long uncontrolled by the government whose officers had committed them, and which had at last taken the exorbitant shape of hostility and of insult seen in the attack on the frigate Chesapeake? Candor will pronounce that less could not be done; and it will as readily admit that the proclamation comprising that measure, could not have breathed a more temperate spirit, nor spoken in a more be-

coming tone. How far it has received from those, whose intrusions it prohibited, the respect due to the national authority, or been made the occasion of new indignities, needs no explanation.—The president having interposed this precautionary interdict, lost no time in instructing the minister plenipotentiary of the U. States to represent to the British government the signal aggression which had been committed on their sovereignty and their flag, and to reqnire the satisfaction due for it; indulging the expectation that his Britannic majesty would at once perceive it to be the truest magnanimity, as well as the strictest justice, to offer that prompt and full expiation of an acknowledged wrong which would re-establish and improve, both in fact and in feeling, the state of things which it had violated.—This expectation was considered as not only honourable to the sentiments of his majesty, but was supported by known examples, in which, being the complaining party, he had required and obtained, as a preliminary to any counter complaints whatever, a precise replacement of things, in every practicable circumstance, in their pre-existing situation. —Thus in 1764, Bermudians and other British subjects, who had according to annual custom take possession of Turk's island for the season of making salt, having been forcibly removed with their vessels and effects by a French detachment from the island of St. Domingo, to which Turk's island was alledged to be an appurtenance, the British ambassador at Paris in pursuance of instructions from his government, demanded as a satisfaction for the violence committed, that the proceedings should be disavowed, the intention of acquiring Turk's island disclaimed, orders given for the immediate abandonment of it on the part of the French, every thing restored to the condition in which it was at the time of the aggression, and reparation made of the damages which any British subjects should be found to have sustained according to an estimation to be settled between the governors of St. Domingo and Jamaica. A compliance with the whole of this demand was the result.—Again in 1789, certain English merchants having opened a trade at Nootka Sound, on the north west coast of America, and attempted a settlement at that place, the Spaniards, who had long claimed that part of the world as their exclusive property, dispatched a frigate from Mexico, which captured the two English vessels engaged in the trade, and broke up the settlement on the coast.—The Spanish government was the first to complain, in this case, of the intrusions committed by the British merchants. The British government, however, demanded that the vessels taken by the Spanish frigate, should be restored, and adequate satisfaction granted previous to any other discussion.—This demand prevailed; the Spanish government agreeing to make full restoration of the captured vessels, and to indemnify the parties interested in them for the losses sustained. They restored also the buildings and tracts of land, of which the British subjects had been dispossessed. The British however, soon gave proof of the little value they set on the possession, by a voluntary dereliction, under which it has since remained.—The case which will be noted last, though of a date prior to the case of Nootka Sound, is that of Falkland's Islands. These islands lie about 100 leagues eastward of the Streights of Magellan. The title of them had been a subject of controversy among several of the maritime nations of Europe. From the position of the islands, and other circumstances, the pretension of Spain bore an advantageous comparison with those of her competitors.—In 1770, the British took possession of Port Egmont, in one of the islands, the Spaniards being at that time in possession of another part, and protesting against a settlement by the British. The protest being without effect, ships, and troops were sent from Buenos Ayres, by the governor of that place, which forcibly dispossessed and drove off the British settlers.——The British government looking entirely to the dispossession by force, demanded as a specific condition of preserving harmony between the two courts, not only the disavowal of the Spanish proceedings; but that the affairs of that settlement should be immediately restored to the precise state in which they were previous to the act of dispossession. The Spanish government made some difficulties; requiring particularly a disavowal on the part of G. Britain, of the conduct of her officer, at Falkland's Islands, which, it was alledged, gave occasion to the steps taken by the Spanish governor; and proposing an adjustment by mutual stipulations in the ordinary form.——The reply was, that the moderation of his Britannic majesty having limited his demand to the smallest reparation he could accept for the injury done, nothing was left for discussion but the mode of carrying the disavowal and restitution into execution; reparation losing its value if it be conditional, and to be obtained by any stipulation whatever from the party injured.——The Spanish government yielded. The violent proceedings of its of-

ficers were disavowed. The fort, the port, and every thing else were agreed to be immediately restored to the precise situation which had been disturbed; and duplicates of orders issued for the purpose to the Spanish officers, were delivered into the hands of one of the British principal secretaries of state. Here again it is to be remarked, that satisfaction having been made for the forcible dispossession, the islands lost their importance in the eyes of the British government, were in a short time finally evacuated, and Port Egmont remains with every other part of them in the hands of Spain.—Could stronger pledges have been given, than are here found, that an honorable and instant reparation would be made in a case, differing no otherwise from those recited, than as it furnished to the same monarch of a great nation, an opportunity to prove, that adhering always to the same immutable principle, he was as ready to do right to others, as to require it for himself.——Returning to the instructions given to the minister plenipotentiary of the United States at London, I am to observe, that the president thought it just and expedient to insert, as a necessary ingredient in the adjustment of the outrage committed on the American frigate, a security against the future practice of British naval commanders, in impressing from merchant vessels of the U. States on the high seas, such of their crews as they might undertake to denominate British subjects.—— To this association of the two subjects, the president was determined, 1st. by his regarding both as resting on kindred principles, the immunity of private ships, with the known exceptions made by the law of nations, being as well established as that of public ships; and there being no pretext for including in these exceptions the impressment (if it could be freed from its enormous and notorious abuses) of the subjects of a belligerent, by the officers of that belligerent. The rights of a belligerent, against the ships of a neutral nation, accrue merely from the relation of the neutral to the other belligerent, as in conveying to him contraband of war, or in supplying a blockaded port.——The claim of a belligerent to search for and seize on board neutral vessels on the high seas, persons under his allegiance, does not therefore rest on any belligerent right under the law of nations, but on a prerogative derived from municipal law; and involves the extravagant supposition, that one nation has a right to execute at all times and in all cases, its municipal laws and regulations, on board the ships of another nation, not being within its territorial limits.——The president was led to the same determination, 2dly. by his desire of converting a particular incident, into an occasion for removing another and more extensive source of danger to the harmony of the two countries: and, 3dly, by his persuasion that the liberality of the propositions authorised with this view, would not fail to induce the ready concurrence of his Britannic majesty; and that the more extensive source of irritation and perplexity being removed, a satisfactory adjustment of the particular incident would be the less difficult. The president still thinks that such would have been the tendency of the mode for which he had provided; and he cannot therefore but regret that the door was shut against the experiment, by the peremptory refusal of Mr. Canning to admit it into discussion, even in the most informal manner, as was suggested by Mr. Munroe.—— The president felt the greater regret, as the step he had taken towards a more enlarged and lasting accommodation became thus a bar to the adjustment of the particular and recent aggression which had been committed against the U. States. He found however an alleviation, in the signified purpose of his Britannic majesty, to charge with this adjustment a special mission to the U. States, which, restricted as it was, seemed to indicate a disposition from which a liberal and conciliatory arrangement of one great object at least might be confidently expected. ——In this confidence, your arrival was awaited with every friendly solicitude; and our first interview having opened the way, by an acquiescence in the separation of the two cases insisted on by his Britannic majesty, notwithstanding the strong ground on which they had been united by the president, it was not to be doubted that a tender of the satisfaction claimed by the U. States, for a distinguished and an acknowledged insult, by one of his officers, would immediately follow.——It was not, therefore, without a very painful surprize, that the error of this expectation was discovered. Instead of the satisfaction due from the original aggression, it was announced that the first step towards the adjustment must proceed from the party injured; and your letter now before me, formally repeats, that as long as the proclamation of the president, which issued on the 2d July, 1807, shall be in force, it will be an insuperable obstacle to a negociation, even on the subject of the aggression which preceded it; in other words, that the proclamation must be put out of force, before an adjustment of the aggression can be taken into discussion.—

In explaining the grounds of this extraordinary demand, it is alledged to be supported by the consideration that the proceeding and pretension of the offending officer has been disavowed: that general assurances are given of a disposition and intention in his Britannic majesty to make satisfaction; that a special minister was dispatched with promptitude for the purpose of carrying into effect this disposition: and that you have a personal conviction that the particular terms, which you are not at liberty previously to disclose, will be deemed by the U. States satisfactory ——With respect to the disavowal, it would be unjust not to regard it as a proof of candour and amity towards the U. States, and as some presage of the voluntary reparation which it implied to be due. But the disavowal can be the less confounded with the reparation itself; since it was sufficiently required by the respect which G. Britain owed to her own honour; it being impossible that an enlightened government, had hostility been meditated, would have commenced it in such a manner and in the midst of existing professions of peace and friendship. She owed it also to consistency with a disavowal on a former occasion, in which the pretension had been enforced by a British squadron, against the sloop of war Baltimore, belonging to the U. States; and finally to the interest which G. Britain has, more than any other nation, in disclaiming a principle which would expose her superior number of ships of war, to so many indignities from inferior navies. ——As little can the general assurances that reparation would be made, claim a return which could properly follow the actual reparation only. They cannot amount to more than a disposition, or at most a promise, to do what the aggressor may deem a fulfilment of his obligation. They do not prove even a disposition to do what may be satisfactory to the injured party, who cannot have less than an equal right to decide on the sufficiency of the redress.——In dispatching a special minister for the purpose of adjusting the differences, the U. States ought cheerfully to acknowledge all the proof it affords on the part of his Britannic majesty, of his pacific views towards them, and of his respect for their friendship. But whilst they could not, under any circumstances, allow to the measure more than a certain participation in an honourable reparation, it is to be recollected that the avowed and primary object of the mission was to substitute for the more extended adjustment proposed by the U. States, at London, a separation of the subjects as preferred by his Britannic majesty; and you well know Sir, how fully this object was accomplished. ——With respect to the personal conviction which you have expressed, that the terms which you decline to disclose, would be satisfactory to the U. States, it is incumbent on me to observe, that with the highest respect for your judgment, and the most perfect confidence in your sincerity, an inseparable objection manifestly lies, to the acceptance of a personal and unexplained opinion, in place of a disclosure which would enable this government to exercise its own judgment in a case affecting so essentially its honour and its rights. Such a course of proceeding would be without example; and there can be no hazard in saying, that one will never be afforded by a government which respects itself as much as yours justly does; and therefore can never be reasonably expected from one which respects itself as much as this has a right to do.——I forbear, Sir, to enlarge on the intrinsic incongruity of the expedient proposed.—But I must be allowed to remark, as an additional admonition of the singular and mortifying perplexity in which a compliance might involve the president, that there are in the letter of Mr. Canning, communicating to Mr. Munroe, the special mission to the U. States, pregnant indications that other questions and conditions may have been contemplated, which would be found utterly irreconcileable with the sentiments of this nation. —— If neither any nor all of these considerations can sustain the preliminary demand made in your communication, it remains to be seen whether such a demand rests with greater advantage on the more precise ground on which you finally seem to place it.——The proclamation is considered as a hostile measure, and a discontinuance of it, as due to the discontinuance of the aggression which led to it.——It has been sufficiently shewn that the proclamation, as appears on the face of it, was produced by a train of occurrences terminating in the attack on the American frigate, and not by this last alone. To a demand, therefore, that the proclamation be revoked, it would be perfectly fair to oppose a demand that redress be first given for the numerous irregularities which preceded the aggression on the American frigate, as well as for this particular aggression, and that effectual controul be interposed against repetitions of them. And as no such redress has been given for the past, notwithstanding the lapse of time which has taken place, nor any such security for the future, notwithstanding the undiminished reasonableness of it,

it follows, that a continuance of the proclamation would be consistent with an entire discontinuance of one only of the occurrences from which it proceeded.——But it is not necessary to avail the argument of this view of the case, although of itself entirely conclusive. Had the proclamation been founded on the single aggression committed on the Chesapeake, and were it admitted that the discontinuance of that aggression merely, gave a claim to the discontinuance of the proclamation, the claim would be defeated, by the incontestable fact, that that aggression has not been discontinued. It has never ceased to exist; and is in existence at this moment. Need I remind you, Sir, that the seizure and asportation of the seamen belohging to the crew of the Chesapeake, entered into the very essence of that aggression; that with an exception of the victim to a trial, forbidden by the most solemn considerations, and greatly aggravating the guilt of its author, the seamen in question are still retained, and consequently that the aggression, if in no other respect, is by that act alone continued and in force?——If the views which have been taken of the subject have the justness which they claim, they will have shewn that on no ground whatever can an annulment of the proclamation of July 2d be reasonably required, as a preliminary to the negociation with which you are charged. On the contrary, it clearly results, from a recurrence to the causes and object of the proclamation, that, as was at first intimated, the strongest sanctions of G. Britain herself would support the demand, that previous to a discussion of the proclamation, due satisfaction should be made to the U. States; that this satisfaction ought to extend to all the wrongs which preceded and produced that act; and that even limiting the merits of the question to the single relation of the proclamation to the wrong committed in the attack on the American frigate, and deciding the question on the principle that a discontinuance of the latter, required of right a discontinuance of the former, nothing appears that does not leave such a preliminary destitute of every foundation which could be assumed for it.—— With a right to draw this conclusion, the president might have instructed me to close this communication, with the reply stated in the beginning of it; aud perhaps in taking this course, he would only have consulted a sensibility, to which most governments would, in such a case, have yielded. But adhering to the moderation by which he has been invariably guided, and anxious to rescue the two nations from the circumstances, under which an abortive issue to your mission necessarily places them, he has authorised me in the event of your disclosing the terms of reparation which you believe will be satisfactory, and on its appearing that they are so, to consider this evidence of the justness of his Britannic majesty as a pledge for an effectual interposition with respect to all the abuses against a recurrence of which the proclamation was meant to provide, and to proceed to concert with you a revocation of that act bearing the same date with the act of reparation to which the U. States are entitled.——I am not unaware, Sir. that according to the view which you appear to have taken of your instructions, such a course of proceeding has not been contemplated by them. It is possible, nevertheless, that a re-examination, in a spirit, in which I am well persuaded it will be made, may discover them to be not inflexible to a proposition, in so high a degree liberal and conciliatory. In every event, the president will have manifested his willingness to meet your government on a ground of accommodation, which spares to its feelings, however misapplied he may deem them, every concession, not essentially due to those which must be equally respected, and consequently will have demonstrated that the very ineligible posture given to so important a subject in the relations of the two countries, by the unsuccessful termination of your mission, can be referred to no other source than the vigorous restrictions under which it was to be executed.——I make no apology, Sir, for the long interval between the date of your letter and that under which I write. It is rendered unnecessary by your knowledge of the circumstances to which the delay is to be ascribed.

(To be continued.)

COBBETT'S
Parliamentary History
OF
ENGLAND.

The Fourth Volume of the above Work, comprising the Period from the Restoration in the year 1660, to the Revolution in the year 1688; will be ready for delivery on Saturday, the 25th instant.—On the same day will be published, the Tenth Volume of "Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates."

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